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LEGAL BARRIERS TO INTERSTATE MIGRATIONt
HERBERT R OBACK
II. ATTACKS "UPON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMIGRANT
AGENCY LAWS
A. Discrimination and Unequal Protection of the Laws
A charge to the courts, early made and frequently repeated, is that the
emigrant agency laws apply in a discriminatory fashion. The constitutional
issues are not always clearly set forth. Nonresident seekers of labor at times
-invoked equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment
of the federal Constitution. Since the criterion for applicability of the emi-
grant agency laws was the prospective location of the workers solicited and
not the location of the agents seeking them,' the problem ultimately revolved
about the differences between hiring for employment within and without the
state.
The supreme court of Georgia, only twelve years after the Civil War, set
the judicial tone for answering the charge in Shepperd v. Commissioners.2
This is the earliest case on emigrant agency laws of which the author has
record. In January, 1877, plaintiffs in error, under fear of being prosecuted
and punished for unlawfully carrying on the business of emigrant agents,
complied with the act of 18763 and paid their money into the county treasury.
They then applied to the county commissioners for an order of refund, and
upon a refusal, petitioned for mandamus. The superior court refused the
writ and the high court, rather than consider the proposed remedy, proceeded
to discuss the constitutionality of the act in view of plaintiffs' challenge. The
court denied that the law was discriminatory on two grounds: (1) Hiring
for employment beyond the state was the only business at issue and the license
applied to all who engaged in it, residents as well as nonresidents; (2) Were
hiring for employment within the state a business as well, it would be so
dissimilar in effect from its out-of-state counterpart as to justify relief from
equivalent licensing. The language of the court on these points follows:
"It is said that the discrimination lies in requiring an expensive license
as a condition of hiring laborers within the state to be employed beyond
tThis is the second of two installments under this heading. The first part of Mr.
Roback's article appeared in (1943) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 286. [Ed.]
'Nonresidence as a ground for discrimination is suggested by a few exemptions written
into current emigrant agency laws. See Part I of this article, (1943) 28 CORNELL L. Q.
286, 300. The separate question whether the laws deny equal protection to the laborers
involved has received little notice from the courts. See note 7 infra.
259 Ga. 535 (1877).
3Ga. Acts 1876, p. 17.
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the state, without imposing a like burden on hiring for employment
within the limits of the state. But the license required is for carrying
on a business; and it does not appear that hiring for internal employment
has become a business here, or is pursued as such by any person or per-
sons. This is enough to dispose of the objection. But if it were other-
wise, no authority has been cited, and we know of none, that would
prevent the state from acting upon occupations (carried on within the
state) in a way to incumber some of them with a tax or license fee, and
leave other occupations, dissimilar in tendency, though not in nature, to
the free will of those who might be inclined to engage in them. Suppose
two rival establishments were in active operations in our midst, one
engaged in offering the laboring population inducements to leave, and
the other engaged in offering them inducements to remain, could not the
state discriminate between the two in police and fiscal legislation? Would
she be obliged to grant the same indulgence, and show the same favor,
to an instrumentality which tended to depopulate her territory, as to one
of opposite tendency? It is true, that to go out of the state, for employ-
ment, is not necessarily to remove or withdraw permanently; but, doubt-
less, a large percentage of hirelings who go out on contracts of employ-
ment never return. Persons who make it a business to hire laborers here
for employment elsewhere, may be required to procure and pay for a
license."
The same court had under review a later version of the emigrant agency
law in Willians v. Fears, decided in 1900.4 The equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment was there charged against the law, and the court
disposed of the contention by citing and adhering to Shepperd v. Commission-
ers. When the case came before the United States Supreme Court in the
same year Chief Justice Fuller also referred to the early Georgia case and
added: "We are unable to say that such a discrimination, if it existed, did
not rest on reasonable grounds, and was not within the discretion of the state
legislature." 5 No conflict with the fourteenth amendment was seen. Subse-
quent state court decisions have followed this course. Thus in 1902 the South
Carolina supreme court said in State v. Napier,6 echoing the Georgia decision
of 1877:
"The business which seeks to induce laborers to leave the State and
the business which promotes the employment of laborers within the State
are so different in their tendencies for good or evil to general interest, as
to justify a different classification and treatment with respect to them.
4110 Ga. 584, 35 S. E. 699 (1900).5Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 276, 21 Sup. Ct. 128, 130 (1900). The Court also
cited Amercan Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. 43 (1900),
upholding a state law which imposed a license tax on sugar refiners but exempted planters
and farmers grinding and refining their own sugar.
663 S. C. 60, 41 S. E. 13 (1902).
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All persons falling within the class named in the statute are in all respects
subject to the same requirements without any discrimination whatever."
In 1937 the Virginia supreme court of appeals observed: "It appears settled
that the difference between a 'labor agent' and 'an 'emigrant agent' affords a
reasonable basis for the classification involved in the statute under considera-
tion."7
B. Prohibitory, Arbitrary or Unreasonable Classification
The emigrant agency laws have been attacked as a prohibitory exercise
of state power over a legitimate business or occupation. Since the courts have
rested their judgment on what they considered the source of this power to be,
it is appropriate here to discuss the character of the state authority asserted to
justify enactment of the emigrant agency laws.
We revert to the reasoning of the Georgia supreme court in Shepperd v.
Commissiners.s The court could observe that hiring for internal employment
had not yet become a business only because the legislature had not designated
it a business for purposes of licensing. Obviously persons were being hired
in Georgia for internal as well as for external employment, the relevant dis-
tinction being the ultimate location of the workers. The court in fact admitted
that the "nature" of the two pursuits was identical though not their
"tendency." If then, the state could distinguish between the two in its police
and fiscal legislation, and "incumber" one with license fees, the law by such
logic sought to eliminate the tendency or possible effect of this business and
not to control the conduct of the business itself. Expressed otherwise, all
consequences of hiring for external employment were considered harmful
to the state, and not only some consequences. The law by its nature was
prohibitory in intent and not regulatory; the court's use of the word
"incumber" is suggestive in this regard. It is to be noted that the court justi-
fied the law in terms of the benefits accruing to the state by retention of the
laborers rather than by control of the recruiting abuses to which these laborers
may have been subjected. The question was not raised whether the "laboring
population" and the "hirelings" themselves suffered an infringement of con-
stitutional rights.
The court's reference in Shepperd v. Commissioners to "police and fiscal"
legislation suggested a dual authority for enactment of the emigrant agency
7Cole v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 868, 193 S. E. 517 (1937). In this case defendant
contended that the laborers as well as himself were denied equal protection of the laws




laws with which the courts have wrestled ever since. Between that decision
in 1877 and the United States Supreme Court case in 1900, two adverse state
court decisions were rendered which may have influenced state legislatures to
designate formally their emigrant agency laws as revenue taxes on occupa-
tions rather than as police measures. The Alabama supreme court in Joseph
v. Randolph,9 decided in 1882, invalidated the state law either as a police or
as a revenue measure. The court stated in its conclusion:
"The legislative intent then is plain upon the face of the act. Its pur-
pose is to prevent free egress of laborers, from the counties designated,
out of the State. There is no tax upon the right of hiring or inducing
them to go elsewhere. But a tax of two hundred and fifty dollars, in the
form of a license, is exacted of every one who makes a contract with a
laborer, or otherwise offers him an inducement to leave the State,
whether for the service of the particular employer or hirer, or for that
of other persons. The license required might thus amount to twice or
three times the value of the hireling's labor. It requires no great draft
upon judicial knowledge to declare that such a tax is in its nature pro-
hibitory, and its natural effect, pursuant to its obvious purpose, is to
seriously clog and impair the laborer's right of free emigration."
As we noted above, 10 the court plainly intimated that approval would have
been given to a law taxing a business or occupation rather than the single
act of hiring for outside employment.
Then, in 1893, the supreme court of North Carolina in State v. Moore"
voided an emigrant agency law'2 of that state for want of uniformity as a
tax and for want of regulatory features as a police measure. This law
expressly excluded from its operation all counties west of a certain line, except
a few specifically named. For soliciting labor in the remaining counties the
emigrant agent was required to pay a fee of $1,000 into the state treasury;
failure to do so constituted a criminal offense, punishable by stipulated fines
or imprisonment. The defendant, without a license, hired six laborers in
New Hanover County for use outside the state. A decision in his favor from
the New Hanover criminal court was appealed by the state.
In the opinion of the court, if the act imposed an occupation tax, it was
plainly discriminatory because some counties were excluded from its appli-
cation. (The inference is plain that the court would find no objection with
a law tlhat covered all counties in the state.) But as a police measure, the law
was unacceptable because it unduly or substantially prohibited a person from
9Supra note 7.
'OPart I, (1943) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 286, 305.
31113 N. C. 697, 18 S. E. 342 (1893).
12 N. C. Acts 1891, c. 75.
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pursuing a lawful occupation. To justify such legislation the business had
to be inherently harmful or dangerous, and the occupation of an emigrant
agent did not fall in this class. The court said further:
"It cannot be seriously contended that a laborer under our system of
government, as indicated by the unquestionable authorities to which we
have referred, does not possess the right of hiring his services to anyone,
either within or without the State. And if he may do this, we are unable
to see, as we have just remarked, how an agent or other persons engaged
in hiring him to be employed without the State, can be considered as
following an occupation, which in itself, is inherently dangerous or harm
ful in the sense mentioned above."'11
The court then proceeded to consider whether the license was restrictive or
prohibitory, setting as the true test of police control protection of the laborer
by preventing recruiting abuses rather than protection of the state by pre-
venting removal of the laborer. The court stated:
"While the probable harm and inconvenience of immigration to the
public may not be averted by such legislation, it is of the greatest impor-
tance to all of the citizens of the State that the inexperienced and artless
laborer may not be imposed upon by the false representations and other
fraudulent practices of an emigrant agent, and it is one of the highest
duties imposed upon the lawmakers to prevent such abuses by prescribing
rigid and appropriate regulations under which the said occupation can
alone be followed."
The court found an "entire absence" of police supervision and held that the
police power could regulate but not indirectly prohibit.
"In this case, however, we have no hesitation in reaching the conclu-
sion that the act in question is not and was not intended as a mere
regulation, but its object was either to tax or to restrict or prohibit that
particular occupation mentioned therein. This is evident from the fact
that it does not contain any of the features of a police regulation, nor
is it connected in any way with any police supervision."
In 1898 Georgia embodied her emigrant agency law in tax acts providing for
levies upon various occupations. Several other states followed suit around the
turn of the century.. 4 When Williamns v. Fears came before the Georgia
13From the authorities cited, the court adduced equally the right of the laborer and
of the labor agent to be free in choosing a lawful occupation. In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98
(1885) ; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 349 (1888); Butchers' Union
Slaughter-House Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct.
652 (1884) ; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509 (1878). These authorities, it may be
noted, provided the substance of the well-known definition which the Supreme Court
gave to "liberty" of the fourteenth amendment in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578,
17 Sup. Ct. 427 (1897), and to which the Court annexed the "right of locomotion" in
Williants v. Fears. See note 140 infra.
14See notes 24, 26, 29, etc. infra.
1943]
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supreme court in 1900,15 the court noted that whereas the previous emigrant
agency laws in 1876 and 1877 provided for a license, the law was now part of
the tax acts-
" . . . these acts describing the tax imposed upon emigrant agents as a
specific tax, and that occupation being embraced in the act along with
other occupations of various character; and the act distinctly recites that
it is passed for the purpose of collecting a tax for the support of the
government and the public institutions, for educational purposes, and to
pay the public debt. It thus being clear that the sum required to be paid
is a tax upon an occupation and not a license to do business, the question
as to whether it is so excessive as to amount to a prohibition of the
carrying on of the business referred to is not involved in this case, nor
is such a question at all raised in the present case."
The court saw no conflict with requirements of the state constitution, adding:
"The right of the legislature to tax occupations and classify the same for
taxation is so well settled now, that such an objection [by accused] needs
nothing more than a passing notice."
When in the same year the Supreme Court of the United States took this
case on appeal, Chief Justice Fuller noted at once the observation of the state
court that-emigrant agents by the tax acts of 1898 were subject to a specific
tax in common with many other occupations, the declared purpose of the levy
being for the support of government; and that the question whether the tax
was so excessive as to be prohibitory did not arise, and was not raised. The
Supreme Court thereupon considered that the question before it was whether
the law should be rejected because of conflict with the federal Constitution.
In deciding for the state, as indicated below,' 6 the Court obviously was im-
pressed by state tax levies for numerous occupations. It noted, for example,
that dealers in futures were required to pay $1,000 annually in each county
of operation, that circus companies were required to pay $1,000 each day of
exhibition in towns and cities of a certain size, etc. The Court concluded
with respect to the emigrant agency provision:
"The general legislative purpose is plain, and the intention to prohibit
this particular business cannot properly be imputed from the amount of
the tax payable by those embarked in it, even if we were at liberty on
this record to go into that subject.
"It would seem, moreover, that the business itself is of such nature
and importance as to justify the exercise of the police power in its
regulation. We are not dealing with single instances, but with a general
business, and it is easy to see that if that business is not subject to
15 Supra note 4.
16See pp. 505, 522 infra.
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regulation, the citizen may be exposed to misfortunes from which he
might otherwise be legitimately protected."
This language is noteworthy. The Court validated the emigrant agency
law as a taxing measure for the support of government, blinding itself to
the true purpose of the law and precluding a discussion of its prohibitory
character. Then the Court proceeded to voice the opinion, obviously a dictum,
that the business was amenable to police regulation. As justification it ad-
vanced protection of the laborer, even though in another part of the decision
it denied that the laborer's constitutional right of free egress was impaired
by the law. 17 Now the state court in this case was anxious to distinguish the
law from its earlier versions which referred to licensing rather than to
revenue; in so doing, the state court made no mention of need to protect
the laboring population by exercise of the police power. Both parties to the
controversy appearing before the Supreme Court plainly took the issue, in
accord with the ruling of the court below, to involve a tax or revenue act and
not a police regulation.' 8 The Supreme Court may have been motivated to
deliver its dictum by a general awareness of abuses rampant in the conduct
of private employment agencies.19 Possibly the Court was influenced by the
simple reference in the early Georgia case of Shepperd v. Commissioners to
the propriety of the enactment in terms of both fiscal and police legislation;
though "police" was not intended there in the sense of regulating recruitment
practices.2 0 The Shepperd case was the only emigrant agency decision cited
by the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice also may have been influenced by
Joseph v. Randolph, a full copy of which was appended to the brief of
plaintiff in error; pointed reference to the "general business" now considered
rather than "single instances," which were the crucial point for the Alabama
court's rejection of police control,21 is suggestive in this regard.2 2 How the
17 See pp. 521, 522 infra.
'sAccording to plaintiff in error, "As the supreme court of Georgia holds this law
to be a tax or revenue act, further authority is not needed to the effect that it cannot
be sustained as a police regulation." Brief for Plaintiff in Error, p. 5. And see Brief
for Defendants in Error, p. 5.
l9According to Justice Brandeis [dissenting opinion in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S.
590, 600, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 666 (1917)] : "The evils incident to private employment agencies
first arrested public attention in America about 1890." In 1901 the supreme court of
Illinois, reviewing an act of 1899 [ILL. IV. STAT. (Hurd, 1899) p. 848], stated: "That
the public welfare demands legislation prescribing regulations and restrictions to protect
against the evils of imposition and extortion which have manifested themselves in the
conduct of private employment agencies is not contradicted by counsel for plaintiff in
error .... " Price v. People, 193 Ill. 114, 61 N. E. 844 (1901). Cf. Ex parte Dickey,
144 Cal. 234, 77 Pac. 924 (1904).20See p. 485 supra.
21See Part 1, (1943) 28 CORNFELL L. Q. 286, 305.
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law could in fact regulate an essentially interstate activity, or even begin to
regulate without a single prescription as to how the business must be carried
on, the Chief Justice did not undertake to say. The North Carolina case of
State v. Moore, which invalidated an emigrant agency law as completely devoid
of police character, received no notice by the Supreme Court.23
With the stamp of approval from the United States Supreme Court, the
states renewed or increased their levies on emigrant agents in each successive
tax statute. The courts by recourse to Williams v. Fears explained the laws
in terms of either (or both) the staie taxing or police powers, and the few
former decisions to the contrary were abandoned. They were unwilling to
call the levies prohibitory.
A North Carolina law of 1901 in one section levied a state tax of $25 on
emigrant agents and in another section prescribed that every individual con-
ducting a business on which a specific tax was levied, should pay the required
tax for every separate location in which the business was carried on. Still
another section authorized the county to levy the same tax and no more.24
One Hunt was indicted by special verdict for procuring, without payment of
the tax, hands to be employed by the Norfolk and Western Railway Company
in Virginia and West Virginia. On appeal, the supreme court of North
Carolina in State v. Hunt25 rejected, among other things, defendant's de-
murrer to indictment as in conflict with the state constitution. The court held
that the tax was not a restriction on the business, any more than a tax on
any other business, that Williams v. Fears put it within the exercise of the
police power, and that the reasonableness of the tax was a matter for the
legislature. Only when enacted solely as a police regulation, said the court,
could that body consider its unreasonableness. Declaring the tax in this case
to be reasonable, the court said that State v. Moore, on which defendant relied,
had a dissimilar set of facts, and to the extent that it conflicted with Williams
v. Fears it was overruled.
An act of 190320 in the same state levied upon emigrant agents an annual
22But Georgia officials, as defendants in error, wished to distinguish Joseph v. Randolph
from the case at bar, as involving in the former case the police and not the taxing power.
Brief for Defendants in Error, p. 5.23Both the state court below and the plaintiff in error before the Supreme Court cited
State v. Moore.24N. C. Laws 1901, c. 9, §§ 84, 102, 104. Apparently the adverse decision in State
v. Moore had inspired a drastic (though temporary) reduction from the original license
tax of $1,000. However, Furches, C. J., dissenting in State v. Hunt, 129 N. C. 686, 691,
40 S. E. 216, 219 (1901), maintained that the ambiguous wording of the act, and the
right of each county to duplicate the state tax, might make the required payment larger
than under the earlier tax.
25129 N. C. 686, 40 S. E. 216 (1901).
26N. C. Acts 1903, c. 247, §, 74.
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tax of $100 for the state and $100 for each county in which the business
was carried on. By special jury verdict one Roberson was found guilty of
violating the law. The supreme court of North Carolina conceded 7 de-
fendant's contention that the statute was an exercise of the power to tax
trades and professions rather than a police regulation. According to the court,
the brief of defendant seemed to suggest that the case of State v. Moore held
a tax of $1,000 imposed by act of 1891 excessive and prohibitive. In that
case, explained the court, the act was held not to be a tax measure for want
of uniformity, and prohibitory only as a police measure. Pointing out that
the act of 1903 under review was part of the revenue act, the court took its
guiding decision to be State v. Hunt. IAh the Hunt case the tax was $25 and
in the instant case $100, but the court was reluctant to pass on the constitu-
tionality of the tax measure because of the amount levied, stating: "We may
inquire into the question of power, but not as to the manner of its exercise."
In Kendrick v. State, decided in 1904,28 the supreme court of Alabama held
that the license upon emigrant agents 9 under review, if sustained at all, must
be sustained under the general power to tax occupations. In the opinion of
the court, the fact that the tax was described in the act as a license did not
render it any the less a tax on occupations for revenue. Furthermore, the
fact that it was contained in a special act rather than in a general revenue bill
was held not material. The court considered that the legislature could provide
for revenue by separate bills if it so wished. The constitutional provision as
to uniformity of taxation was held inapplicable to a license tax on occupations,
the court agreeing to examine into the question of constitutionality only when
discrimination among members of the same class of occupations was so great
as to manifest an intention to burden and crush out a particular one. In this
case the court saw no data in the record to permit a judgment whether the
license tax was so excessive and unreasonable. It noted that the amount of
the tax was identical with that sustained by the supreme courts of Georgia
and of the United States in Williams v. Fears.
The supreme court of South Carolina, sustaining" in 1902 a law of the
state which imposed a $500 license upon emigrant agents for every county
of operation,3 1 held that the law conformed to the constitutional requirement
of uniformity in taxation and suggested that issuance of the license constituted
a police regulation. The court said:
2 7State v. Roberson, 136 N. C. 587, 48 S. E. 595 (1904).
28142 Ala. 43, 39 So. 203 (1904).
29Ala. Acts 1903, p. 344.30State v. Napier, 63 S. C. 60, 41 S. E. 13 (1902).
31S. C. Laws 1898, pp. 812, 813.
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"It is easy to see that the business is of such nature that the legislature
might well see fit to thus regulate it, not only for the protection of the
agricultural and manufacturing interests of the State, but for the pro-
tection of the laborers themselves against the acts and solicitations of
designing and irresponsible persons; who may ply such a vocation in
order to levy contributions from the ignorant and allured laborers, and
then not be found when the laborers, according to appointment, appear
at the railroad station to take their departure with him to their fields of
labor. Payment of the license fee and the issuance of the license by the
proper authority, afford some guarantee or evidence of good faith in the
conduct of such business."
In 1919 when the same court sustained32 a law imposing a li~ense of $2,000
upon emigrant agents for each county of operation,33 it maintained that the
statute was enacted in exercise of the state's police power. In support of this
proposition, the court adduced the decision in State v. Napier, discussed
immediately above, and the dictum from Willian v. Fears. Thereupon it
stated :
"When the doing of an act comes within the police power, the legis-
lature has the authority to prohibit it entirely or to enact such regulations
as it may deem advisable. If it undertakes to regulate such an act by
requiring a license, the object is the protection of the public, and it is
not intended for the benefit of the licensee. The defendant, therefore,
has no right to complain, even though the statute may be regarded as
prohibitory in its effect."
The court rejected a charge that the license fee placed upon the business was
not graduated but prohibitory and discriminatory in violation of a provision
in the state constitution.3" It pointed to the provision as being permissive
rather than mandatory and denied that the constitution intended license taxes
on occupations, falling within the police power, to be graduated. The court
said:
"Such a requirement would not be of any benefit to the public, but
would limit the power of police, which has been defined as the State's
right of self-defense. State v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222, 20 S. E. 221, 26
L. R. A. 345. It would be unreasonable to suppose that it was the inten-
tion of the Constitution to require a graduated license tax in those cases
where the licenses were mere instrumentalities in the enforcement of the
police power, as in the present case."
The supreme court of Mississippi, sustaining 35 in 1918 a state law which
32State v. Reeves, 112 S. C. 383, 99 S. E. 841 (1919).
33S. C. C. CODE 1912, § 896.
34S. C. CONST. OF 1896, Art. X, § 1.35Garbutt v. State, 116 Miss. 424, 77 So. 189 (1918).
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imposed an annual license of $500 upon emigrant agents for each county of
operation, 36 rejected appellant's charge that the amount of license was pro-
hibitory in the following language:
"In view of the activity of labor agents in Mississippi within the past
few years, and the free emigration of laborers to other states, especially
the heavy transportation of colored laborers to the Northern states-
amounting the past year to a veritable 'exodus'--we are not prepared to
declare the tax prohibitory. The amount of the tax is primarily a legis-
lative question."
The only instance known to the writer when the amount of an emigrant
agency tax may have been judicially disapproved occurred in connection with
an initial provision of the Texas law.37 At the first called session in May,
1929, the legislature levied an occupation tax on emigrant agents amounting
to $7,500.38 A Michigan beet sugar company, engaged in extensive recruit-
ment of Texas-Mexican labor, applied in the federal district court of Northern
Texas for an injunction against the enforcement of this act. A temporary
injunction was granted, the court apparently being influenced by the excessive
amount of the tax.3 9 To meet this objection, the Texas legislature immediately
repealed the law and enacted a new one which provided for an annual state
occupation tax of $1,000 and an annual county occupation tax graduated
according to the population in the county of operation. 40 The same company,
in the name of a recruiting agent, again sought to enjoin enforcement of the
law. Plaintiff contended in part that the new law would prevent him from
following his avocation of securing employment for the unemployed because
the tax was prohibitory. The state countered this charge, maintaining that
36[iss. Laws 1912, c. 94.
37FREuND, POLICE POWER (1904) § 489, 527, makes it appear that the emigrant agency
laws in Joseph v. Randolph and State v. Moore were struck down merely because "the
license fee was prohibitive." See the discussion supra pp. 486, 487. In coding the West
Virginia laws, of which Acts 1927, c. 16 and Acts 1929, c. 12 levied a $5,000 fee on
emigrant agents, the code committee omitted these tax provisions "as being prohibitory
and therefore unconstitutional." A legislative note in the 1937 Code (§ 921) observes
that the parts omitted by the code committee are restored.38Texas Gen. and Spec. Laws 1929, 1st called session, c. 104, p. 253. Section 2 stipu-
lated a $5,000 tax for use of the state and a $2,500 tax for use of the county, both
to be levied in each county of operation.
39The writer has found only secondary references to this order. See Dallas Morning
News, June 2, 1929; San Antonio Express, June 2, 1929; LAWS RELATING TO EMPLOY-
MENT AGENCIES IN THE UNITE- STATES As OF JULY 1, 1937 (U. S. Dep't of Labor Bull.
No. 630), p. 11; TAYLOR, MExrcAN LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES [Univ. of Cal. Pub. in
Economics, Vol. 6, No. 5, (1930)], 331.40Texas Gen. and Spec. Laws 1929, 41st Leg., 2d called session, c. 11, p. 16. Another
law of the same legislative session (c. 96, p. 203) provided for an annual license fee of
$10 and detailed regulations to be observed by emigrant agents.
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six agents had duly complied with the law and paid their fees.4 ' The court
in Hanley v. Moody et al.42 sustained the law as a valid exercise of the police
power and then declared: "It having been determined that power vests in
the state to regulate a court may not declare occupation taxes unreasonable
when the facts show that a number of such agents have paid the taxes and
complied with the law."'43 In concluding this part of the inquiry the court
said: "While the tax imposed upon the emigrant agent is large, and while the
plaintiff alleges that he is unable to pay it, we are not prepared to enjoin it
as an illegal and oppressive exercise of the state's sovereign power."
.The court seemed to rely upon Williams v. Fears in precluding a judgment
as to the prohibitory character of the occupation tax, but justified the law
under the state's police power in accordance with later decisions of the
Supreme Court, for example, Brazee v. Michigan decided in 1916.4 .1 Mr.
Justice Reynolds, speaking for the Court in the latter case, had stated:
"Considering our former opinions it seems clear that without violating
the Federal Constitution a State, exercising its police power, may require
licenses for employment agencies and prescribe reasonable regulations in
respect of-them to be enforced according to the legal discretion of a
commissioner. The general nature of the business is such that unless
regulated many persons may be exposed to misfortunes against which
the legislature can properly protect them."
41Cf. the following statement in a report of Texas employment service officials, Sep-
tember, 1940, Hearings before Select Conmmttee to Investigate the Interstate Migration
of Destitute Citizens (hereinafter cited as Tolan Committee Hearings), 77th Cong., 3d
Sess., part 5, 1810: "That the occupation tax provisions for emigrant agents in Texas
has [sic] been largely inactive is apparent from the fact that, according to the records,
only one company has ever paid tle State occupation tax of $1,000. That was shortly
after passage of the Texas emigrant agency law." If this statement is true, it suggests
that the state as defendant was referring to compliance with the nominal license law
rather than with the onerous occupation tax law. But the court rested the case on the
alleged fact that six emigrant agents had paid occupation taxes.
4239 F. (2d) 198 (N. D. Tex, 1930).
4 3By setting this criterion the court shuts out from the business of recruiting all but
the wealthiest operators, who usually represent large corporations. The U. S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, recommending revisions in H. R. 5510, a bill to regulate private
employment agencies engaged in interstate commerce (77th Cong.), so as to insure that
the small agent or contractor would not be driven out of business, has stated: "In the
agricultural field, many of the private employment agencies, labor contractors, and group
leaders are very small operators, representing only a very small group of workers. In
some instances they may function for only one specific crop operation. The employment
agent, contractor, or group leader may himself be employed in some phase of the crop
operation and his remuneration in the form of fees in some cases may actually be very
small, and little more than the overhead costs involved in contacting employer and
employees and transporting employees to the area of employment. . . ." Hearings before
Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor oiP H. R. 5510, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941)
(hereinafter cited as Hearn.qs on H. R. 5510) 179.
44241 U. S. 340, 36 Sup. Ct. 561 (1916).
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The last sentence quoted was clearly adapted from the two-sentence dictum in
Williams v. Fears holding emigrant agencies amenable to police regulation.
45
And indeed Williamns v. Fears was cited as the first of several supporting
cases appended to this statement in the Braee case.46 We do not take issue
with the propriety of the ruling in Brazee v. Michigan which placed hiring
for internal employment within the exercise of the police power. We note,
however, that "the general nature of the business" cited by the Court in 1916
was not identical with the "general business" mentioned by the Court in 1900.
Hiring for internal employment was considered in the earlier decision to be
either non-existent or else so dissimilar in tendency from hiring for external
employment as to justify a sharp difference in tax classification. 47
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the prevalence of improper
hiring practices left no doubt that hiring for internal employment had become
a "business. '48 In a number of states, regulatory laws were enacted. With
these developments, if we assume according to the dictum in Williams v. Fears
and the subsequent decisions of state courts that emigrant agents are subject
to police regulation for the protection of job applicants, we may find two
laws within a state which claim to protect persons from irresponsible and
explQitive practices of labor agents. The one levies a prohibitive fee of
several thousand dollars upon emigrant agents and the other a relatively
nominal fee upon ordinary employment agents. But the disparity cannot
be related to the expenses incident to administration of each law and
has never been so explained. In exercise of the police power the means
employed must be "reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose." 49 Clearly the two laws are not directed to the same purpose.50 It
45Supra pp. 488, 489.46Supra note 44 at 343, 36 Sup. Ct. at 562 (1916). The court below (People v. Brazee,
183 Mich. 259, 263, 149 N. W. 1053, 1054 (1914)] had also cited the Williams v. Fears
dictum as affirming the power of the legislature to regulate private employment agencies.47Chief Justice Fuller had cited Shepperd v. Commissioners as "approved and followed
in this case." Williams v. Fears, supra note 5 at 275, 21 Sup. Ct. at 130 (1900).48See the factual summary in dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Adams v.
Turner, supra note 19.49Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 501 (1894).
60An illustration of a law which seeks to regulate emigrant agents as well as employ-
ment agents is the recent comprehensive employment agency law of Pennsylvania (Pa.
Laws 1941, Act No. 261, p. 622). Section 14 provides as follows:
"No person shall enter this Commonwealth and attempt to hire, induce, solicit or
take from this Commonwealth any labor, singly or in groups, for any purpose
without first filing in the office of the department a statement as to where the labor
is to be taken, for what purpose, for what length of time, and whether transportation
is to be paid to and from destination, if temporary, also a statement of the financial
standing of the company desiring the labor and an affidavit of authority to represent
such company in this Commonwealth, and such other information as the department
may require.
"The department shall thereupon determine whether the person desiring such labor
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may be argued that only by prohibitive fees can the state control a business
where transactions are initiated within the state but always completed outside.
This does not mean that the business is incapable of regulation; it merely
signifies that the state is incompetent to regulate in a field which requires
uniform, national action.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned prohibition of a business by its very
nature harmful to the public interest,51 but it has flatly refused to place
employment agencies in this class. When the state of Washington sought to
make it unlawful for private employment agents to receive fees from job
applicants, the Supreme Court stated in Adams v. Turner after acknowledging
the validity of police regulation: "But we think it plain that there is nothing
inherently immoral or dangerous to public welfare in acting as paid repre-
sentatives of another to find a position in which he can earn an honest living.
On the contrary, such service is useful, commendable, and in great demand."' ' 2
If, instead of an outright prohibition, the state had levied an extremely large
fee upon the business of an employment agency, the Court undoubtedly would
from this Commonwealth is an employment agent and, if so, whether'such person is
qualified to be licensed under this act. -After such investigation the department
may refuse to license or may grant a license upon compliance with the provisions of
this act. Such person shall in the event of unfavorable action by the department
have the right of appeal as in other, cases under this act. If such person shall be
exempted from license he shall pay for registration a fee of five ($5.00) dollars and
receive therefor from the department a certificate recognizing his right to do
business in this Commonwealth."
Waiving the question whether the state labor department has valid jurisdiction over
the operations of an out-of-state agent, we may note that the law does not discriminate
against such 'agent in the matter of license fees, and in fact may exempt him from pay-
ment. There is the administrative possibility of discrimination by refusing to grant
licenses to out-of-state agents, although internal agencies are subject to the same refusal
(§ 7) and the right of appeal obtains in both cases. For comment on the interstate
features of the Pennsylvania law, see testimony of Lewis G. Hines, Secretary of Labor
and Industry, Hearigs on H. R. 5510, 175.
Louisiana has a provision [LA. GEN. STAT. (1939) tit. 34, c. 3, § 4304.2] substantially
similar to Section 14 of the Pennsylvania law, but discrimination against the out-of-state
labor agent is made effective by another section (4304) of the Louisiana law, which
requires a $500 license of all agents and then permits an alternative license of $50 for
those who maintain regular offices and transact all business from such offices, and who
do not solicit labor "except by written, telegraphic or telephonic communication." The
effect of this qualification is to make out-of-state agents mainly subject to the higher fee.
Strictly considered, the Louisiana law should be classed with those listed in Part I,
(1943) 28 CORNELL L, Q. 286, n. 6.5 1 See Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903) for discussion on this point.
5 2Adams v. Turner, supra note 19 at 593, 37 Sup. Ct. at 664 (1917). The California
supreme court had said a dozen years earlier in Ex parte Dickey, su*pra note 19:
"The business in which this defendant is engaged is not only innocent and innocuous,
but is highly beneficial, as tending the more quickly to 'secure labor for the unem-
ployed. There is nothing in the nature of the business, therefore, that in any way
threatens or endangers the public health, safety, or morals." See also Spokane v. Macho,
51 Wash. 322, 324, 98 Pac. 755 (1909).
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have decreed likewise.5 3
It should be noted that state regulation of employment agencies is devoted
to the purpose of protecting, not alone the unemployed worker, but also the
employer who may suffer from the practices of unscrupulous labor agents.
Obviously the emigrant agency laws extend no protection to employers
dealing with these agents, since by definition such employers are located
beyond the limits of the state. When police regulation of emigrant agents is
put forth, as in State v. Napier and State v. Reeves,54 for protection of the
"agricultural and manufacturing interests," as well as of the "ignorant and
allured laborers," the police power is conceived to embrace measures designed
to retain and immobilize the internal labor supply.55 This application of the
police power must be carefully distinguished from that envisaged by the
Supreme Court in Brazee v. Michigan, namely, control of abusive practices
by employment agents.56 Whatever merits may be adduced in behalf of the
53With an eye on the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Adams v. Turner. the
writer holds no brief for the preservation of the fee-charging private employment agency,
but he observes (1) that the Justice founded his dissent on the assumption that "no
question of interstate commerce is involved" and (2) that if the state would prohibit
with the intent that the Justice envisaged it would not confine the prohibition to emigrant
agents alone.5 4Supra notes 30, 32.
5 5Besides deriving general benefit from immobilization of the labor supply, resident
employers are accorded pecuniary protection by some emigrant agency laws. In Alabama,
for example, a $5,000 bond must be filed as prerequisite to issuance of the license and,
among other things "said bond shall be conditional on the payment of such damages as
any person may sustain by reason of his servant or employee having been enticed away
or caused to leave employment by said person [applying for license], his representative
or employee or by reason of his advertising matter, circulars, letters and the like, or of
the solicitation of such agent or his emissaries." ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 51, § 519. The
Georgia law requires that emigrant agents, before taking or attempting to take any person
from the state, shall give bond to be accepted and approved by the Commissioner of
Commerce and Labor, conditioned to pay any valid debt owing by said person to any
citizen of the state. GA. CODE (1933) § 92-506.
50 The emigrant agency laws, except those that require simply a license tax of desig-
nated amount, make some show of protecting the job applicant by requiring the agent
to file periodic information on wage rates, place of destination, conditions of employment,
etc. In several laws provision is also made for inspection of the agent's records and
premises. Alabama requires the agent to file a $5,000 bond conditioned, among other
things, "on the payment of such damages as any person may sustain by reason of any
false representations or misrepresentations made to such person by such person applying
for such license, or any of his agents, representatives, or in any advertisement or where
such laborer is to be sent for employment, or the written or printed matter, as to the
nature of the place and surroundings thereat, duration, or any other feature of the pros-
pective employment, together with such damages as may be sustained by failure to secure
the promised employment." ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 51, § 519.
Regarding regulatory provisions of the emigrant agency laws, it is clear from their
context that they are designed to hinder and harass the operations of the agent rather
than to protect his client. In Georgia, for example, the agent must report his emigrant
activities daily to the Commissioner of Commerce and Labor. GA. CODE (1933) § 54-110,
par. 3. The bonding requirement in Alabama, to repair damages suffered by a laborer
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former application, it cannot be sustained at the price of limiting fundamental
personal rights and federal prerogatives under the Constitution of the United
States.
The Supreme Court originally sustained the emigrant agency law as a
revenue measure for the support of government. 57 State legislatures have not
been willing to realize an equivalent revenue from the business of hiring for
internal employment. 'Thus the power of taxation is used as an instrument
of the state police power in impounding the labor supply for the advantage of
resident employers. Decisions of the Supreme Court approving joint exercise
of state police and taxing powers to enhance the general prosperity of a state
or to "adjust economic differences" in competition with other states58 never
could have contemplated that the rights of one ecoiaomic class be sacrificed
to the interests of another within the same state.
The dual source of authority offered in justification of the emigrant agency
laws has enabled the courts to shuttle between the police and revenue powers
in affirming the power of the legislature to designate onerous fees. In Hanley
v, Moody et al.,5 9 for example, the court said in effect that the police power
justified enactment of the law, and the taxing power justified the large amount
of the levy. While the South Carolina supreme court in State v'. Reeves
judged the police power sufficient to preclude judicial consideration of the
amount of the levy, other state courts have preferred to shift their ground
for this stand to the revenue side of the laws. 60
The distinction betweeff police and revenue powers presents a nice case of
multiple fee collection when the same person solicits laborers for employment
both within and without the state. As employment agent he fnay come under
the police power, and as emigrant agent he may come under the police and/or
revenue powers. Accordingly he may be called upon to pay two or three
in outside employment, would require that the laborer return home to institute action-
which achieves in part the original purpose of the law. In general the locus of effective
administration and enforcemenf of these laws in behalf of the worker is largely in other
states and so beyond the jurisdiction of the licensing state.57Williamns v. Fears, mtzpra note 5.
58At. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412, 57 Sup. Ct. 772 (1937). See also
Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633 (1900). The claim that measures
designed to discourage out-migration of laborers enhance the general prosperity of the
southern states is of course controverted by numerous studies of population and migration.
These states have the highest birth rates and are most heavily overpopulated in relation
to economic resources. See the testimony of Dr. Rupert P. Vance, Tolan Committee
Hearings, part 2, pp. 406 et seq. The salient population literature is noted in Supplement
to Brief of John H. Tolan, amicus curiae, Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup.




separate fees, one of which is certain to be the burdensome occupation tax.
In 1915 Tennessee passed an act61 prescribing a privilege tax for employ-
ment agencies. In 1917 the state passed two more acts: chapter 70 levied a
tax of $500 per annum on the privilege of conducting an emigrant agency;
chapter 78 provided for the regulation and supervision of employment agen-
cies, requiring .the payment of a license fee to the department of factory
inspection; details of regulation and reporting were set forth and a penalty
prescribed on failure to comply. In the same year, the city of Knoxville by
ordinance also made the business of emigrant agent a privilege and required
such agents soliciting in the city to pay $500 per annum. One McMillan, who
held an unexpired license under the employment agency act" of 1915, was
found guilty of violating the 1917 city ordinance applying to emigrant agents.
When the case came to the state supreme court on appeal, a number of related
questions were considered: (1) whether the last act (chapter 78) operated
to repeal by implication the other act or acts; (2) whether appellant was liable
for the emigrant agency tax of $500; and (3) whether license held by appel-
lant as operator of an employment agency protected him in doing the acts
complained of, which were done after passage of the city ordinance but before
his license had expired.
The court distinguished first between a license in the "truer sense" issued
under the police power, and a license issued on payment of an "occupation
tax" levied under the taxing power embodied in the constitution, with revenue
as the primary object and regulation as a possible incident. "The two charges
and licenses are distinct things, but confusion of tholught arises at times, due
to the fact that a license may be issued in either case. In the one case the
power exercised is that to license, and in the other to tax and to license." The
court thereupon held it competent for the legislature to provide a regulatory
license for, and also levy an occupational tax upon, the business. The two
taxes were held not to be inconsistent nor to impinge upon each other; there-
fore the enactment of chapter 78 (employment agency) did not repeal chapter
70 (emigrant agency). Whatever regulation was manifest in the imposition
of the occupation tax could be increased by the more detailed policing regu-
lations set forth in chapter 78, and a fee fixed therefor. The court observed
that a true license fee, as distinguished from an occupation tax, should be
fixed to cover the expense of issuing it, the service of officers, and other
expenses directly or indirectly incident to supervision of the particular busi-
ness or vocation; it was also noted that no question arose as to whether the
license fee was so excessive or unreasonable as to partake of the nature of
a tax.
OlTenn. Acts 1915, c. 101.
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The court then considered contention of appellant that since he had a privi-
lege license to operate an employment agency until October 8, 1917, he could
not be required by the city, in order to continue his emigrant business, to take
out a license under chapter 70 of the acts of 1917. This act, together with the
ordinance thereunder, was passed while his license was current. The city
claimed per contra that after the passage of the 1917 act and its own ordinance,
appellant exercised a separate privilege from that formerly exercised under
his license as employment agent. The court held that any definition of
"employment agency" in the absence of restrictive words would include the
employment of laborers to work for another either in or beyond the state, and
that the act of 1915 should be so construed. 62 "The phrase 'employment
agency' does not imply the placing of laborers and domestic servants in the
borders of the State only." The question then resolved itself into "whether it
lay in the power of the city under legislative authority to carve out of the
broader privilege of conducting an employment agency, one of its elements,
employment of emigrant labor, and impose an occupation tax on the conduct
of it." The court observed "that-the attempt to creaLte by subdivision a distinct
privilege of conducting emigration agencies was the state's under its power;
and that the city did not undertake without precedent and specific legislative
power to make two privileges out of the business formerly conducted as an
employment agency." The privilege tax in this case was held to be levied not
merely for revenue, but with regulation as an incidental purpose; in such a
case the state and city could change the privilege and deny appellant the right
to continue the emigrant feature of his business under his unexpired license.
In Texas the attorney general of the state was asked to rule upon a similar
case of multiple obligation.63 It appeared that in San Antonio and other areas
of the state with large Mexican-American populations, agencies acting prin-
cipally in an emigrant capacity were also assisting persons to secure employ-
ment within Texas. The state commissioner of labor statistics had collected
from each of these agencies two sets of fees: an annual state license fee of
$150 for each county of operation, levied upon them as employment agencies;
and an annual state license fee of $10 for each county of operation, levied
upon them as emigrant agencies. Now came the tax assessor-collectors in
counties where these agencies operated, demanding that they pay two sets of
taxes: a state tax of $1,000 and a graduated county tax for each county of
621n support of this construction, the court pointed to a stipulation in the 1917 employ-
ment agency act (chapter 78) that operators of employment agencies could not ship
applicants to any point outside the state without first advising them as to the existence
of strikes, etc.
63 Opinion No. 0-2120, April 23, 1940, contained in Law Supplement to TEXAS STATE
EmPLOYMENT SERVICE REPORTS ON MIGRATORY LABOR, Supplement C (November 1941).
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operation, both levied upon the occupation of emigrant agent. The state con-
troller of public accounts thereupon requested an opinion whether agencies
hiring and soliciting labor. for employment both within and beyond the state
were liable for all the licenses and taxes mentioned above. The attorney
general of Texas stated in his opinion:
"A distinction should be pointed out between a license fee collected
under the general police power of the State, and an occupation tax levied
under the general powers of taxation and revenue residing in the Legis-
lature, except as prohibited by the Constitution of Texas or of the United
States ......
In accordance with this distinction, the attorney general allotted to the police
power the license fees levied on employment agents and emigrant agents by
the commissioner of labor statistics, and to the revenue power the occupation
taxes levied on emigrant agents by the county tax assessor-collectors. That
emigrant agents were required to pay one of the license fees was explained
as follows:
"The Legislature was not content merely to realize revenue from the
occupation or business of 'Emigrant Agent', but deemed such occupation
or business sufficiently affecte4 with a public interest to warrant its regu-
lation and require, in the interests of the public welfare, certain condi-
tions prerequisite to engaging in such business. .. ."
(Thus a detailed set of regulations was prescribed relative to the filing of
information with the commissioner of labor statistics, and payment of the
occupation taxes was made a prerequisite to issuance of the license to emigrant
agents). But an emigrant agent acting also as an employment agent must
pay two licenses for regulation, in addition to ihe occupation taxes, because:
"By comparison of the statutory definition of the terms 'Emigrant
Agent' and 'Employment Agent', it is apparent that two distinct and
dissimilar occupations or businesses were contemplated-the first term
embracing the business of hiring persons to be worked or employed only
outside the State of Texas, while the latter term includes purely internal
or intrastate transactions in the bringing together of employers and
employees into relations of employment."
C. Burden upon Interstate Commerce
Whether presented as police or as revenue measures, the emigrant agency
laws must fall if they constitute a burden or restriction upon interstate com-
merce. These laws must fall likewise if they interfere with free egress as a
privilege or immunity of national citizenship. The writer does not incline to
the position that migrating Americans have a single source of constitu-
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tional protection from state interference.0 4 The commerce power is considered
first, however, because the problem extends beyond protection of the right of
egress. 5 Affirmative action by the federal government to regulate interstate
employment agencies, a field in which the states are incompetent, is most
feasible under the commerce power. 66
Possible conflict of the emigrant agency laws with the interstate commerce
clause of the federal Constitution was not broached in the early cases. The
issue was squarely put to the supreme court of Georgia in 1900.67 The court
said:
"If the act imposes a tax upon persons engaged in commerce among
the States, it is a regulation of such commerce and is void.. Such a tax
is in effect a tax upon the business itself. This has been so repeatedly
ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States that it will not at this
day be questioned. [cases cited]."
From a review of cases0 8 the court deduced that commerce embraced traffic,
intercourse, navigation, transportation of persons and property, and the means
and instrumentalities to effectuate these four things. 9 Applying the criteria
64See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct. 252 (1935) ; Edwards v. California,
314 U. S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164 (1941). el
65Regarding the relative merits of the commerce power and the fourteenth amendment
in protecting the right of ingress or egress, it is frequently pointed out that the privileges
and immunities clause applies only to citizens whereas aliens can be reached by the longer
arm of the commerce clause. See oral argument before the Supreme Court of attorney
for appellant in Edwards v. California, supra note 64, reproduced in Tolan Committee
Hearings, part 26, 10212; also (1942) 40 MicH. L. REv. 711, 724; (1942) 9 U. OF Cm..
L. R.v. 334, 337; (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 139, 141; (1942) 14 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 77,
84, 85. The citizenship qualification, however, does not apply to the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, for which a case can be made in
protecting the right of movement. Thus in Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7
(1915), the Court said in effect that aliens admitted under federal law could pursue the
ordinary means of livelihood anywhere in the Union without -state interference. See also
Geiow v. Uh, 239 U. S. 3, 36 Sup. Ct. 2 (1915), where the Court refused to sanction
denial of entry to aliens by immigration officers who decided that the city of putative
destination had an overcrowded labor market.
66Cf. (1942) 42 COL. L. Rav. 139, 140. This raises the question, of course, to what
extent the right of ingress or egress can be curtailed by federal action. Id. at 141. It
should be noted that the possibility of affirmative federal action is not ruled out under
the privileges and immunities clause. The fourteenth amendment by section 5 provides
that "The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions
of this article." For a judicial evaluation of this section, see Civil Rights Cases, 109'
U. S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18 (1883).
67Williams v. Fears (Ga.), supra note 4.
68 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824); Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419
(U. S. 1827); Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560 (U. S. 1873); Gloucester Ferry Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 Sup. Ct. 826 (1885) ; Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S.
691 (1880) ; Wabash, etc., Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557,7 Sup. Ct. 4 (1886).
69 Counsel for plaintiff in error, arguing the case before the Supreme Court of the
United States, contended for a fifth category, "emigration," to embrace the occupation of
emigrant agent, and he observed as to the six cases cited by tho state court (supra note
[Vol. 28
INTERSTATE MIGRATION BARRIERS
in this sequence to the law under consideration the court said regarding the
first:
"We do not think the business of procuring labor contracts to be per-
formed in another State can be properly denominated 'traffic'. Labor is
not an article of merchandise or a commodity. It is toil, mental and
physical. It is part of the person himself, which he may dispose of it is
true, but which is not severable from hiiAn, and which accompanies him
wherever he goes. It will not be pretended that persons are the subjects
of commerce."
Under the heading of intercourse as a branch of commerce the court placed
the free passage of citizens of the United States through the several states.
Citing Crandall v. Nevada and'other cases,70 the court considered that a tax
on the right of a citizen to enter or leave the state would be a regulation of
commerce and therefore 'void.
"But the law under consideration in the present case neither regulates
nor restricts the right of citizens of this State to leave its territory at
will, or to hold free communication with the citizens of other States. The
citizen may leave when he pleases, but the person who makes it a business
of inducing him to go to perform labor elsewhere must pay an occupa-
tion tax. This is certainly no infringement upon the right of the citizen.
Nor does the law impose any burden upon any instrumentality by which
his free intercourse with the citizens of other States is effectuated."
Further the court held that the law had no reference to navigation and
was not a regulation of transportation among the states.
"But this law imposes no burden upon transportation companies or
their agents. Its connection with transportation is exceedingly remote.
That the business of hiring laborers to go beyond the State may increase
the business of those engaged in interstate transportation is true, but it
is not interstate transportation itself, and consequently a law imposing
a tax upon a person engaged in such a business is not contrary to the
interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution."
The Supreme Court of the United States, when it took Williams v. Fears
on appeal, set for itself the following definition of commerce contained in
Mobile County v. Kimball:71
68) : "The cases cited are no authority that this business is not an occupation connected
with interstate commerce. In none of them was the present question involved, and for
.t to have been decided, therefore, would be nothing short of unwarranted." Brief for
Plaintiff in Error, pp. 6, 7, 11.71Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1867) ; Henderson v. Mayor, etc., 92 U. S.
259 (1875) ; People v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59, 2 Sup. Ct. 87
(1882); Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (U. S. 1849).7lSutpra note 68.
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"Commerce with foreign nations and among the States, strictly con-
sidered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navi-
gation and the transportation of persons and property, as well as the
purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities." 72 I
It thereupon proceeded to judge the activities of emigrant agents in relation
to transportation as follows:
"These agents were engaged in hiring laborers in Georgia to be em-
ployed beyond the limits of the State. Of course, transportation must
eventually take place as the result of such contracts, but it does not
follow that the emigrant agent was engaged in transportation or that
the tax on his occupation was levied on transportation." -
The Court then cited five cases on interstate commerce to support its decision
that emigrant agents were not engaged in interstate commerce. We list them
here briefly to indicate the framework of the Court's reasoning:
(1) McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 10 Sup. Ct. 881 (1890), where
the agency of a line of railroad between 'Chicago and New York, established
in San Francisco for the purpose of inducing passengers going from San
Francisco to New York to take that line at Chicago, but not engaged in selling
tickets for the route or receiving or paying out money on account of it, was
held an agency engaged in interstate commerce and therefore not subject to a
municipal ordinance tax. Chief justice Fuller, who had dissented from this
opinion, nevertheless in Williams v. Fears distinguished the railroad agency
from the emigrant agency as follows : "But there the business was directly
connected with interstate commerce, and consisted wholly in carrying it on.
The agent was the agent of the transportation company, and he was acting
solely in its interests."
(2) Norfolk and Western Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S.
72This definition, it should be noted, was originally formulated as a denial of the
proposition that the mere grant of the commerce power, anterior to any act of Congress,
was exclusive of all state authority. The Court felt impelled in the Mobile County case
to explain the divergences of some judges upon the issue of exclusive authority because
of alleged failure to distinguish between commerce as "strictly defined" and the local aids
or auxiliaries to commerce. The Court did not say that the auxiliaries were necessarily
removed from commerce; it held merely that the national authority was exclusive in
the matters "strictly defined" as above-matters admitting of but one system of rules
and one authority. It is of some interest, therefore, that in Williams v. Fears the Court
decided that broad as was the import of the word "commerce" in the Constitution, "this
[strict] definition is quite comprehensive enough for our purposes here."
In so deciding the Court followed the state court below. The latter suggested that the
language of individual Supreme Court justices might be broad enough to include the
emigrant agency business within the scope of the commerce clause; but it saw no decision
extant, and therefore it refused to broaden construction of the clatse to include emigrant
agents; "this being so, the law will be held valid notwithstanding it may place a burden
upon. a business which may be an aid to, but not a part of, commerce among the states."
William v. Fears (Ga.), supra note 4.
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114, 10 Sup. Ct. 958 (1890), where the tax imposed by a state on a corpora-
tion owning a link of railroad on an interstate through line, for the privilege
of keeping an office in the state, was held a tax on interstate commerce, and
therefore void.
(3) Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73 (U. S. 1850), where a broker dealing
in foreign bills of exchange was held not engaged in commerce, and a state
tax on money and exchange brokers was not void as a regulation of commerce,
merely taxing an instrument of commerce.
(4) Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868), where the issuing of an
insurance policy was held not a transaction of commerce, but a simple contract
of indemnity against loss by fire, entered into by the corporation and the
assured for a consideration paid by the latter. A state law requiring a foreign
insurance corporation to obtain a license by payment of a stipulated sum was
not in conflict with the commerce power.
(5) Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 Sup. Ct. 207 (1894), where
a section of the penal code of California making it a misdemeanor for a
person in that state to procure insurance for a resident of the state from an
insurance company not incorporated under its laws, unless such company had
filed a bond required by the laws of the state relative to insurance, was not a
regulation of commerce.
Chief Justice Fuller quoted from the last case the "real distinction" between
the general rule and its exceptions-
"and which consists in the difference between interstate 6ommerce or an
instrumentality thereof on the one side and the mere incidents which
may attend the carrying on of such commerce on the other. This dis-
tinction has always been carefully observed, and is clearly defined by the
authorities cited. If the power to regulate interstate commerce applied to
all the incidents to which said commerce might give rise and to all .con-
tracts which might be made in the course of its transaction, that power
would embrace the entire sphere of mercantile activity in any way con-
nected with trade between the States; and would exclude state control
over many contracts purely domestic in nature."
Applying the standard to the issue in Williams v. Fears,
"The imposition of this tax falls within the distinction stated. These
labor contracts were not in themselves subjects of traffic between the
States, nor was the business of hiring laborers so immediately connected
with interstate transportation or interstate traffic that it could be correctly
said that those who followed it were engaged in interstate commerce, or
that the tax on that occupation constituted a burden on such commerce."
We submit that by a highly artificial and forced distinction the interstate
1943]
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business of an emigrant agent was resolved into a series of incidents. Iso-
lating formation of the labor contract as the primary element in the transac-
tion, the Court judged that such a contract was essentially local and inci-
dental. To what then was it incidental? To the interstate transportation which
"must eventually take place"? But transportation was regarded as a somewhat
remote consequence of the contract which might be incidental to it. In other
words, a void was created between labor contracts, which like bills of exchange
or insurance contracts were considered not to be subjects of interstate traffic,
and interstate transportation, which was considered not to be the business of
an emigrant agent.
The deficiencies in the reasoning of the Court may be examined relative to
the following issues: (1) the proper subject of interstate commerce in the
case at bar; (2) the relationship between this interstate commerce and its
intrastate counterpart; (3) the relationship between this interstate commerce
and transportation.
(1) The Court denied that labor contracts were the subject of interstate
traffic. This may be conceded but it is beside the point. The Court fell into
error by arguing from the imperfect analogy of an insurance contract. The
interstate feature of the contracts considered in Paul v. Virginia and Hooper
v. California involved at most their transmission or delivery from one state
to another.738 In the emigrant agency business, the labor contract does not
become an autonomous item to be transmitted like an insurance contract or
bought and sold like a bill of exchange. The subject, of commerce is properly
the laborer who agrees to move out of the state for employment.7 4 The state
73Argu'ment of plaintiffs in these cases rested on the fact that the insurance corporations
were not domiciled in the states where the insurance was purchased. Neither goods nor
persons moved across state lines to effect the transactions, but, at most, paper forms to
be processed by the company of the local agent. Pieces of paper are transmitted through
the mails, of course, and the Court obviously was reluctant to let the scope of commerce
be defined by the easy workings of our postal system. This sentiment was clearly mani-
fest in Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73 (U. S. 1850), involving the bill of exchange.
"It is not transmitted through the ordinary channels of commerce, but through the mail."
Later in N. Y. Life. Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495, 509, 34 Sup. Ct. 167,
172 (1913), approving all the insurance decisions initiated by Paid v. Virginia, the Court
said: "The effort has been to give a special locality to the contracts and determine their
applicatory law, and, indeed, to a centralization of control, to employ local agents but
-to limit their power and judgment. To accomplish the purpose there is necessarily a
great and frequent use of the mails, and this is elaborately dwelt on by the insurance
company in its pleading and argument, it being contended that this and the transmission
of premiums and the amounts of the policies constitute a 'current of commerce among the
States'. This use of the mails is necessary, it may be, to the centralization of the
control and supervision of the details of the business; it is not essential to its character."
74Cf. Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405, 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 526, 529 (1908)
where the Court said in regard to the insurance cases: "These cases are not in conflict
with those in which it is held that the negotiation of sales of goods in a state by a
person employed to solicit for them in another State, the goods to be shipped from the
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court below in Williams v. Fears at least came to grips with the issue when,
refusing to dissociate labor from the person of the laborer, it denied that
persons were the subjects of commerce.7 5 In support of this denial the state
court cited a United States Supreme Court decision of 1841 which upheld a
provision in the Mississippi constitution of 1832 prohibiting introduction of
slaves into the state "as merchandise or barter." In that case it was a matter
of some debate among the justices whether slaves were persons and whether
Mississippi was interfering with the commerce power of the national govern-
ment.76 Today the argument is no longer entertained that persons "are not
the subject of commerce." 77
one State to the other, is interstate commerce. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing
District, 120 U. S. 489; similar cases are Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, and
Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622. In these cases goods in a foreign State
are sold upon orders for the purpose of bringing them to the State which undertakes to
tax them, and the transactions are held to be interstate commerce, because the subject-
matter of the dealing is goods to be shipped in interstate commerce; to be carried between
States and delivered from vendor to purchaser by means of interstate carriage."
Comparison of the drummer for the nonresident firm with the emigrant agent is
apropos, because Georgia officials as defendants in error in Williams v. Fears adduced in
support of their position Ficklen v. Shelby County, 145 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810 (1892).
This case had been decided by Chief Justice Fuller in favor of the taxing state and
therefore out of line with decisions in similar cases. Counsel for plaintiff in error in
Willians v. Fears observed that the Ficklen case actually was against defendants, because
the general commission business taxed had the interstate feature as an incident and not
as an object of the law. Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff in Error, p. 3. And the court
later took this position, reverting to Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District as the
leading case and as decisive of the issue before it. Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27,
22 Sup. Ct. 576 (1902).75See supra p. 503.70Groves et al. v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 448 (U. S. 1841). The court also referred to
Commonwealth v. Kentucky, 42 Ky. 208 (1842), which was likewise inconclusive on the
applicability on the commerce clause to the importation of slaves into a state.
77Edwards v. California, mtpra note 64; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470,
37 Sup.-Ct. 192 (1917) ; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913) ;
United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143 (1919) ; Covington Bridge Co. v.
Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087 (1894) ; Bailey v. United States, 74 F. (2d)
451 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934) ; Whittaker v. Hitt, 285 Fed. 797 (App. D. C. 1925) ; Gowling
v. United States, 269 Fed. 215 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920) ; United States v. McClure, 15 F.
Supp. 931 (D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1936) ; United States v. Burch, 226 Fed. 974 "(D. C. N. D.
Cal. 1915). Justice Stone, dissenting in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 Sup. Ct.
252 (1935), stated at 444, 56 Sup. Ct. at 265: "This court has many times pointed out
that movements of persons across state boundaries are a part of interstate commerce,
subject to the regulation and entitled to the protection of the national government under
the commerce clause." Again he referred to the citizen moving interstate as "an
acknowledged subject of the commerce clause." 296 U. S. at 449, 56 Sup. Ct. at 268.
In Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 314, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913), the assistant
attorney general for the United States observed that Justice Barbour's statement in
New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 136 (U. 5. 1837), that persons "are not the subject of
commerce," has never received the sanction of the Court but has been expressly refuted.
Mr. Justice Wayne, analyzing the Miln decision in Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 430 et
seq. (U. S. 1849), emphasized that Justice Barbour received little support from his own
colleagues for exclusion of persons from commerce.
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(2) The Court denied that the business of hiring laborers was immediately
connected with interstate commerce. This denial came naturally from the
false premise that a labor contract and an insurance contract were "cognate."
Ever since Paul v. Virginia insurance contracts have been generically excluded
fropn interstate commerce. 78 Insurance today is a great interstate enterprise79
far different from the predominantly local activity that the Court knew in
1868; but admittedly the Court has preferred to take the easy way out via
stare decisist ° or to seek other constitutional sources of protection for partici-
pants in thebusiness.8s Inclusion of the emigrant agency business within the
distinction quoted from Hooper v. California between interstate commerce
and its domestic components expresses the usual concern of the Court that
a line must be drawn somewhere, lest "the entire sphere of mercantile activity"
be engulfed by the national government. That construction is not applicable
in the instant case. The key to the business of the emigrant agent is that he is
an intermediary8 2 in a transaction, the completion of which necessarily involves
the movement of persor~s across state lines. Interstate passage is the indis-
pensable condition and not a derivative or occasional consequence in the
performance of the contract. By that clear-cut test the business of hiring
for external employment is interstate commerce,83 distinguisheA from hiring
for internal employment. If the two businesses can be separated for purposes
Chief Justice Marshall earlier appeared to assert the authority of the commerce clause
over the movement of persons by inference from the constitutional limitation on Congress
(U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 9, cl. 1) regarding "the migration or importation" of slaves prior
to the year 1808. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 206, 207 (U. S. 1824) ; The Wilson
v. United States, .30 Fed. Cas. 239, 243 (C. C. D. Va. 1820). For a brief discussion
of the early reach of the commerce power over persons, see Grant, State Power to
Prohibit Interstate Commerce (1937) 26 CAL. L. REv. 34, 49.78Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 653, 15 Sup. Ct. 207, 209 (1895) ; N. Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, supra note 73 at 510, 34 Sup. Ct. at 172 (1913).
79See STUDY OF LEGAL REsFERvE LIFE INSURANCE CO-MPANIES [T. N. E. C. Monograph
No. 28, § 2, (1940)].
80"For over forty-five years they [insurance cases reviewed] have been the legaljustification for such legislation. To reverse the cases, therefore, would require us to
promulgate a new rule of constitutional inhibition upon the States and which would compel
a change of their policy and a readjustment of their laws." N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer
Lodge County, spra note 73 at 502, 34 Sup. Ct. at 169 (1913).81Colgate v. Harvey, supra note 64 at 432, 56 Sup. Ct. at 260 (1935).82
"The business of securing employment for those seeking work and employees for
those seeking workers is essentially that of a broker, that is, of an intermediary . . .
that business does not differ in substantial character from the business of a real estate
broker, ship broker, merchandise broker or ticket broker." Brazee v. Michigan, supra
note 44 at 356, 36 Sup. Ct. at 562 (1916).83Cf. Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1, 17 (C. C. A.
8th, 1907) : "Importation from one state into another is the indispensable element, the
test of interstate commerce; and every negotiation, contract, trade, and dealing between
citizens of different states, which contemplates and causes such importation, whether it
be of goods, persons, or information, is a transaction of interstate commerce'
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of tax classification, they can be identified with respect to the areas of state
and federal control. Denial to the state of control over the operations of
emigrant agents does not entail any diminution of control over the intrastate
business of employment agents. The states have been guaranteed their control
in the latter sphere. 84
Failure to recognize that interstate movement is requisite to performance
of the labor contract in the emigrant agency business has led to a persistent
misapplication of Williams v. Fears. Chief Justice Fuller, dissenting in the
Lottery Case,85 tried to put it within the principle of the insurance cases and
his decision in the emigrant agency case. He dissented again in International
Textbook Co. v. Pigg,8 6 where the majority held that contracts with a corre-
spondence school were a part of interstate commerce because they entailed
necessarily the movement of textbooks and related instruments of learning
across state lines. Later in N. Y. Life I.vs. Co. v. Deer Lodge Cou11nty,87 the
Court refused to place an insurance contract in interstate commerce according
to the old line of decisions, and it considered Williams v. Fears as "cognate"
while distinguishing its decision from the Lottery and Pigg cases which "were
concerned with transactions which involved the transportation of property
and were not mere personal contracts." In Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub.
Co.,88 where the subject under consideration was the making of contracts for
insertion of advertising matter-in certain periodicals, the Court cited Williams
v. Fears in line with its decision but differentiated the Pigg case because "The
advertising contracts did not involve any movement of goods or merchandise
in interstate commerce, or any transmission of intelligence in such commerce."
In Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission,,s the Court decided that a steve-
doring company was engaged in interstate commerce while loading and
unloading but not while supplying longshoremen to shipowners or masters
without directing or controlling the work of loading or unloading. To the
latter extent the company was held subject to a state tax. Supplying of long-
shoremen was likened to the work of a "labor bureau" such as that considered
in Williams v. Fears, where the business was found not to partake of inter-
state commerce though it increased the transactions of commerce. Now this,
as with other applications of the emigrant agency decision, is only seemingly
plausible. Without debating the merits of the Puget Sound decision we may
84Brazee v. Michigan, supra note 44; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236, 61 Sup. Ct.
862 (1941).85Supra note 51.
86217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481 (1910).87Supra note 73.
88252 U. S. 436, 40 Sup. Ct. 385 (1920).
89302 U. S. 90, 58 Sup. Ct. 72 (1937).
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note that the employment referrals did not necessitate the movement of long-
shoremen across state lines. Performance of the longshore labor contract
took place wholly within the state, and the business of the stevedoring com-
pany raised only the question where the line should be drawn in separating
local incidents of the interstate or foreign commerce carried on by a merchant
vessel. The emigrant agent by contrast is not a local auxiliary to, but is
h:mself engaged in, interstate commerce.
In Western Live Stock v. Bureau, decided in 1938,90 the Court similarly,
cited Williams v. Fears in support of the proposition that taxation of a local
business or occupation was not forbidden merely because in the ordinary
course interstate transportation was induced or occasioned by the business.
A state law attempted to tax the receipts of a business engaged in selling
advertising space in a published journal, and the Court was called, upon to
decide the "vexed question whether the tax is invalid because the performance
of the contract, for which'the compensation is paid, involves to some extent
the distribution, interstate, of some copies of' the magazine containing the
advertisements." (Italics supplied). In upholding the state law the Court
decided that the business of preparing, printing, and publishing magazine
advertising was peculiarly local and distinct from its circulation, whether or
not that circulation went in interstate commerce. If it be argued by analogy
that the making of labor contracts is peculiarly local and distinct from the
"circulation" of the laborers, then the definitive character of the emigrant
agent is eliminated. The Court rightly stressed in the Western Live Stock
case that performance of the contract was as essential as its formation in
determining the protective scope of the commerce clause, but there interstate
distribution was 'an occasional rather than an indispensable factor in conduct
of the business.91
(3) The Court denied that the emigrant agent was engaged in transporta-
tion or that the tax upon his business was levied on transportation. Had the
Court identified persons contracting rather than labor contracts as the subject
of commerce in the case under review, the relationship between the emigrant
agency business and transportation might have been made more clear. In the
Lottery Case control by the natibnal government under the commerce power
90303 U. S. 250, 58 Sup. Ct. 546 (1938).
91In general, the Court in this and related cases is concerned to strike a balance
between the demands (1) that interstate commerce shall "pay its own way" locally and
(2) that interstate commerce shall not be subject to discriminatory and multiple tax
burdens. With regard to the business of emigrant agency, clearly the prohibitive taxes
levied by states do not conform to either of these demands. Cf. South Carolina Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 185, 186, 58 Sup. Ct. 510, 514 (1938) ; Gwin etc.
Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 439, 59 Sup. Ct. 325, 327 (1939) ; and see (1942) 42
COL. L. REV. 139, 141.
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was justified because there was involved "actual carriage in interstate traffic
of the tickets themselves." The same power extended where persons were
involved.92 The involvements in either case did not signify necessarily that
the persons carrying on the reprehensible practices were themselves engaged
in transportation. 3 And in the Pigg case, the. correspondence school judged
to be in interstate commerce did not itself transport the textbooks which fol-
lowed the contracts with prospective scholars. Similarly the emigrant agent
to be in interstate commerce does not have to transport prospective jobholders.
The scope of the commerce power is determined by that which is transported
as well as by that which transports.
Preoccupation of the Court with the business of transportation in interstate
commerce as conducted directly by a common carrier is evident from the cases
contrasted 4 with Williams v. Fedrs. It would be interesting to speculate as
to the Court's decision if the plaintiff in error were the agent of a railroad
company recruiting section hands for employment directly by the company.
Such persons have been held liable as emigrant agents.95 Possibly the case
then might have been brought into accord with McCall v. California, which
the Court cited as inapplicable. A latter-day perspective destroys even the
Court's opinion that emigrant agents were not themselves engaged in trans-
portation. The automobile was not a well-developed American institution in
1900 when Chief Justice Fuller decided Williams v. Fears. In those days
physical means of conveyance for emigrants were provided chiefly by railroad.
Today motor truck transportation of migrant workers directly by labor agents
is a common practice. The Interstate Commerce Commission subjected one
phase of this transliortation to intensive investigatioh0 6 and finally caught up
with a labor agent whom Texas authorities, we have seen, were at pains to
designate an emigrant agent.0 7
Julio de la Pena was charged by the United States on forty-five counts with
transporting passengers in interstate commerce for compensation without
conforming to the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission.98
0 2 See note 77 stpra.
93The fact that these cases dealt mainly with affirmative federal action in the field of
crime prevention does not alter the logic of the argument.
94McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 10 Sup. Ct. 881 (1899); Norfolk & Western
Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114, 10 Sup. Ct. 958 (1890).
95State v. Bates, 113 S. C. 129, 101 S. E. 651 (1919).
96The investigations of the Interstate Commerce Commission are reported in Tolan
Committee Hearings, part 5, pp. 1878-1883; part 11, pp. 4773-4822; part 19, pp. 7796-7855.
97Part I, (1943) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 286, 304.
O8The scope of interstate commerce in this field is not limited, of course, to the juris-
diction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. See Whitaker v. Hitt, supra note 77
at 798 (App. D. C. 1925). The Motor Carrier Act of 1935 [49 STAr. 543, 49 U. S. C.
§§ 301-327 (1940)] applies to certain classes of common and contract carriers but
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On every one of these counts the Great Lakes Sugar Company, and its inter-
mediary, the Great Lakes Growers' Employment Committee, were found
guilty of "having knowingly and wilfully aided and abetted the defendant
Julio de la Pena in committing the violation alleged." The latter was ordered
to pay $1,000 and costs, and the court agreed that upon payment of $2,000
and costs by the Employment Committee, a nolle prosequi would be entered
as to the Sugar Company proper.99
The Supreme Court recently has made it clear by the decision in Edwards v.
CalifornOa'00 that a state law which seeks to restrict the entry of persons into
a state is an unwarranted interference with interstate commerce. If Edwards,
driving his indigent brother-in-law Duncan in a jalopy across the California
border, was adjudged to be within the sphere of interstate commerce, it will
not be pretended that emigrant agents who transport or arrange for the
transportation of laborers out of a state are excluded from this sphere. In
both circumstances the determining factor is the movement of persons across
state lines, not the manner of conveyance' 0 ' nor indeed the commercial status
of the conveyor. 0 2
Edwards was neither a common carrier' nor the agent of a common carrier,
and the state sought to minimize application of the law to carriers.1° 3
The grasp of the state law did not even hinge upon whether Edwards directly
and alone undertook the transportation. 10 4 The fact that the law could act
upon him only after he arrived in the state did not make any less "intended
excludes fron its operation by Section 303 (b) (9) the casual or occasional transporta-
tion by motor vehicle of passengers in interstate commerce by persons not engaged in
such transportation as a regular occupation or business. The chairman of the Com-
mission reported to the Tolan Committee that this section would keep many interstate
truckers of labor outside the purview of the Motor Carrier Act. Tolan Committee
Hearings, part 5, 1879.
99o,... apparently upon the theory that the committee was its alter ego and the fine
of one was the fine of both." Testimony of Jack G. Scott, Chief attorney, Bureau of
Motor Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission, Hearings on H. R. 5510, 37. See
also Tolan Committee Hearings, part 11, pp. 7833 et seq. for record of court judgment.
'ooSupra note 64.
'
1DEven walking across a state line, be the mover animal or person, satisfies the
commerce requirement. Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 259 (1902);
Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 77.
'
0 2
"And the transportation of persons has long been held to be commerce. Interstate
commerce then is, among other things, the passage of persons or property from one state
to another. It does not necessarily, or indeed at all, involve the idea of a common
carrier, or the payment of freight or fare." United States v. Burch, supra note 77 at
975, 976.
'
0 3 0ral argument of W. T. Sweigert, assistant attorney general of California, before
the Supreme Court of the United States, recorded in Tolan Committee Hearings, part 26,
10218.
'
0 4 CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE (Deering, 1937) § 2615, makes it a mis-
demeanor to knowingly bring or assist in bringing an indigent person into the state.
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and immediate"'10 5 the burden upon interstate commerce. Similarly the fact
that the emigrant agency law can act upon the agent only before he leaves the
state does not make the law local in nature and incidental to commerce.
The extension of the Edwards case to the emigrant agency issues need not
rest on our construction. Though the criminal statute under which Edwards
was apprehended can be traced back to an early California poor law,'0 5 the
attorney general of California, in his brief submitted to the Supreme Court
on behalf of the state as appellee, maintained that the law was directed chiefly
at curtailing the "promotional" activities of "labor contractors, private employ-
ment services and other recruiting agencies.' 0 7 In a supplemental statement
filed with the Court he pointed to Williams v. Fears as holding emigrant agents
"a proper subject of police power," and he observed a "striking analogy"
between such agents and those who induced the entry of indigent persons into
his state.10 8 The assistant attorney general of California, appearing before
the Supreme Court in oral argument for the state, also likened the attempted
exercise of the police power, retarding ingress of indigent persons, to the
emigrant agency laws, retarding egress of laborers. Said he of the appel-
lant :109
"He has committed an act that is well within the purview of the power
of the State of California to denounce as a crime on police grounds, and
in that sense involves a matter of local police power and not any more
an interference with interstate commerce than, let us say, the statute
involved in the case of Williars v. Fears."
We submit that the emigrant agency laws of some ten states L0 must fall
with the California penal statute and similar penal statutes in twenty-seven
other states"' as exceeding the appropriate limits of state action. By restrict-
ing the interstate movement of underprivileged groups in the working popu-
lation, the emigrant agency laws, in keeping with other anti-migration stat-
utes,"12 display the characteristics which moved the Court to its decision in
the Edwards case: (1) they are isolative; (2) their real victims have no
effective recourse to the ballot box ; i 13 (3) they invite retaliatory action and
'O5justice Byrnes in Edwards v. California, sitpra note 64 at 174, 62 Sup. Ct. at 167
(1941).
'
0OCal. Stat. 1860, p. 213.
'O7Reprinted in Tolan Committee Hearings, part 26, 10021.
1O8Id. at 10089.
1091d. at 10225.
il#See Part I, (1943) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 286, n. 6.
"iFor a list of these state laws which have been struck down by the Edwards deci-
sion, see Supplement to Brief of John H. Tolan, ainicus curiae, Edwards v. California,
reprinted in Tolan Committee Hearings, part 26, pp. 10188 et seq.
"12See FREuND, POLICE POWER (1904) c. 23, §§ 485-491.
"13 For reasons less transitory, of course, than the exclusion involved in the Edwards
case.
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make burdens cumulative; (4) their subject-matter admits of regulation only
by a single authority. Mr. Justice Byrnes, speaking for the Court, in Edwards
v. California, after acknowledging state efforts to cope with internal problems,
said:
"But this does not mean that there are no boundaries to the permissible
area of State legislative activity. There are. And none is more certain
than the prohibition against attempts on the part of any single State to
isolate itself from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the
transportation of persons and property across its borders. It is frequently
the case that a State might gain a momenfary respite from the pressure
of events by the simple expedient of shutting its gates to the outside
world. But, in the Words of Mr. justice Cardozo: 'The Constitution
was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial
in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
States must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity
and salvation are in union and not division.' Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S.
511, 523.
"It is difficult to conceive of a statute more squarely in conflict with this
theory than the Section challenged -here. Its express purpose and in-
evitable effect is to prohibit the transportation of indigent persons across
the California border. The burden upon interstate commerce is intended
and immediate; it is the plain and sole function of that statute. More-
over, the indigent non-residents 'who are the real victims of the statute
are deprived of the opportunity to exert political pressure upon the
California legislature in order to obtain a change in policy. South
Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 185,
n. 2. We think this statute must fail under any known test of the validity
of State interference with interstate commerce.
.. The prohibition against transporting indigent non-residents into
one State is an open invitation to retaliatory measures, and the burdens
upon the transportation of such persons become cumulative. Moreover,
it would be a virtual impossibility for migrants and those who transport
them to acquaint themselves with the peculiar rules of admission of many
States. 'This Court has repeatedly declared that the grant [the commerce
clause] established the immunity of interstate commerce from the control
of the States respecting all of those subjects embraced within the grant
which are of such a nature as to demand that, if regulated at all, their
regulation must be prescribed by a single authority.' Milk Control
Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346, 351. We are of the
opinion that the transportation of indigent persons from State to Staje
clearly falls within -this class of subjects. The scope of Congressional
power to deal with this problem we are not now called upon to decide."
"The scope of the Congressional power to deal with this problem," upon
which Justice Byrnes was silent, has been delineated in part by the Honorable
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John H. Tolan, chairman of the Select Committee Investigating National
Defense Migration. He introduced into the seventy-seventh Congress H. R.
5510, "A bill to regulate private employment agencies engaged in interstate
commerce."11 4 The hearings on H. R. 5510 held by a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Labor make it clear that abusive practices of interstate
labor agents, visited upon employer as well as employee, demand regulation
by a single controlling authority." 5 In summarizing the findings of his
Committee on Migration before the subcommittee holding hearings on the
bill, Chairman Tolan stated :110
"The committee has concluded that Federal regulation of private
employment agencies and labor contractors engaged in interstate com-
merce is imperative. While it is true that a few States have enacted
effective and well-administered laws for the licensing or registration of
employment agencies, State action on the-whole does very little to cub
the practices of the unscrupulous private agent oy contractor. Even were
State laws to be extended and improved they could not cope with a prob-
lem so largely interstate in character.
114Earlier drafts of this bill were introduced by Mr. Tolan during the 77th Congress
as H. R. 3372 and H. R. 4675. In the 78th Congress this bill appears with changes
recommended by the House Labor Committee as H. R. 809. The Senate duplicate of
H. R. 5510 was introduced in the 77th Congress as S. 2333 by the Honorable Elbert D.
Thomas of Utah.
115The report of the subcommittee to the House Committee on Labor, dated January
13, 1942, stated in part as follows [H. R. REP. No. 1709, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)
pp. 2-3]: 
"The record of these hearings has convinced your subcommittee of the need for
this proposed legislation. The results of abuse among employment agencies in inter-
state commerce have been alarming..
"Your subcommittee is of the furthier opinion that the State laws, where they
exist, are practically ineffective to remedy abuse arising from interstate operations.
There are four reasons for this. First, the agencyt may not be subject to regulation
because employment agency laws vary greatly in effectiveness and do not exist in
every State. Second, the law of one State cannot reach agencies situated in another. d
Third, those persons who are sent some distance away across State lines have no
real opportunity to complain to the proper authority of violations of the law of the
State where the placement agency may be operating. Fourth, many labor agents
continually move from one State to another, making control impossible."
However, H. R. 5510 contains an unfortunate provision, which one opponent of the bill
referred to as "rather slipsho4 legislative drafting." Hearings on H. R. 5510, 225; and
see p. 254. Section 16 provides: "No provision of this Act or of any rule, regulation,
or order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any State law or municipal ordi-
nance regulating employment agencies." Labor Department officials whd gave the Tolan
Committee technical assistance in drafting the bill, apparently wished to encourage
enforcement of state employment agency laws. ("It is designed to care for the inter-
state aspects of labor recruiting and to supplement the state laws"-testimony of Clara M.
Beyer, Division of Labor Standards, U. S. Dep't. of Labor, Hearings on H. R. 5510, 161).
If H. R. 5510 sanctions compliance with state emigrant agency laws it goes contrary
to its avowed purposes. Properly the proposed legislation should supersede state emi-
grant agency laws. Support given to the bill by Texas authorities would seem to be
predicated upon the idea of its compatibility with their emigrant agency law.
"1OHearings on H. R. 5510, 18.
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"It is true that not all private employment agents and labor contractors
prey on the defenseless job seeker. Many are efficient and honest. The
prohibition of reprehensible practices should do much to protect these
agencies from their unfair competitors.
"At the present time there is no specific Federal legislation which
regulates the practices of interstate labor agents. Clearly engaged in
interstate commerce, these agents could be brought under the authority
of the Federal Government, which alone is equipped'and empowered to
protect interstate commerc6 from origin to destination. Many witnesses
appearing at the committee hearings, in every section of the country,
testified to the desirability of specific Federal legislation in this field."
The intent of this bill is clearly to regulate and not to prohibit.117 The
annual license is fixed at $100. Interstate employment agents also are re-
quired to file a bond with the Secretary of Labor and to conform to other
prescribed regulations for the protection of their clients. Among the author-
ities giving hearty endorsement to the bill appeared the commissioner of the
Texas Bureau of Labor Statistics. He testified that he had the responsibility
for enforcing the emigrant agency law of his state and explained that this
law was enacted because the employment agency law" 8 failed to protect
employees who were exploited in other states. 1 9 Obviously the emigrant
agency law could protect employees only by keeping them at home, because
inability of the state to regulate an interstate.activity was clearly admitted.
The commissioner testified in part :120
"I believe that the State of Texas has gone as far as possible with
State regulations in an attempt to correct this problem. I have been a
State law-enforcement officer since 1933, and I believe that I am qualified
to state that this legislation can be improved very little as far as State
117The report on H: R. 5510 by the subcommittee of the House Committee on Labor
stated: "It is realized that the responsible agency, of which there are many, will be
regulated along with the irresponsible agency. This is necessary to protect both the
good agency and the public. It is felt that those who are honest and efficient have
nothing to fear from this legislation, designed solely to curb dishonest practices." H. R.
REP. No. 1709, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 3. A representative of the United States
Department of Agriculture testified on H. R. 5510: "Since the legislation proposes to
regulate the practices of these employment agencies so as to eliminate recognized abuses
and detrimental effects, without unduly hindering the necessary migration of agricultural
workers across state lines and without eliminating or abolishing those services of private
employment agents and labor contractors which are beneficial to both agricultural workers
and agricultural employers, the Department of Agriculture endorses the general state-
ments of policy of the proposed H. R. 5510." Testimony of William J. Rogers, Office
of Agricultural Defense Relations, U. S. Dep't. of Agriculture, Hearings on H. R. 5510,
179. It should be noted, however, that this witness recommended a lowering of the
minimum fee and bond provisions of the bill in favor of the small operator. Id. at pp
179, 181.
"1STEx. ANN. REy. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1939) c. 13, arts. 5208-5221.
"19 Hearings on H. R. 5510, 172.
120d. at pp. 172, 173.
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enforcement is concerned. The various States would have to be given
authority to regulate interstate commerce to really become effective. We
know that many of our investigations regarding violations of this bill
have led us to the State line, where our investigation had to be terminated.
The very nature of this business makes it impractical for any State to
regulate.
"Many, many times violations have been reported to this office, and
despite the fact that our investigators were on the job within a matter
of hours, the violators were then across the State line and completely
beyond our jurisdiction.
"May I conclude by saying that it is my opinion that our State has
done everything within its police power to stop the abuses and the
exploitation of employees going from one State to another, and we are
still unable to handle this problem as it should be. Coming from a State
where most everyone believes in States' rights and are reluctant' to sur-
render any of these -rights to the Federal Government, yet we recognize
there are some problems, the very nature of which prohibit us from
properly regulating them as they should be. This is one of those problems,
and as commissioner of the Texas Bureau of Labor Statistics, I earnestly
urge that H. R. 5510 be enacted into law in order to give us the needed
relief in connection with this problem. I have .made a careful study of
H. R. 5510, and while I believe that is by no means a complete solution
to the emigrant workers problem, it will go a long way in correcting the
evils which are so common at this time."
D. Interference with the Privileges and Imrnunities of Citizens of the United
States
The right to pass freely from state to state is an incident of national citizen-
ship protected from state interference by the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution.1 21 The right is not articulated by the Constitution in so many
words,122 but its implicit character does not weaken the constitutional guar-
antee. As an incident of national citizenship the right should be distinguished
from the narrower concept embodied.in state citizenship and referrable to
121Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Edwards v. California, supra note 64 at 178, 179,
62 Sup. Ct. at 169 (1941). He maintained that free ingress and egress as a right of
national citizenship already had been established by Crandall v. Nevada, supra note 70,
prior to enactment of the fourteenth amendment. On this view, it has been argued, the
fourteenth amendment protects no privilege or.immunity that is not already guaranteed
by the supremacy clause (U. S. CONsT. Art. VI). The redundancy of the fourteenth
amendment follows from the restricted interpretation given to the privileges and immu-
nities clause ever since the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872). See dis-
senting opinion of Justice Field at 97; also McGovney, Privileges or linnnities Clause,
Fourteenth Amendment (1918) 4 Iowa L. BULL. 219, 230.
122ARgic zs Or CONFEDERATIoN, Art. IV, expressly stipulated that "the people of each
state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any- other state." Note that the
stipulation was absolute and not confined to-citizens.
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the priyileges and immunities clause of Article IV, section 2 of the Consti-
tution.12 3 Again it should be distinguished from the incidents of free move-
ment and intercourse protected from state -interference by the national com-
merce power. 124 The divided opinion of the Supreme Court in the early case
of Crandall v. Nevada has not smoothed the path for judicial consideration
of the right of free ingress and egress. Mr. Justice Douglas prefers to rest
the Crandall decision not upon the commerce clause hut upon the more basic
'ground of national citizenship1, 5 He holds "that the right of persons to move
freely from State to State occupies a more protected position in our consti-
tutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across
state lines.' 2
6
The right of laborers to 'depart freely from a state has been urged in
arguments against the emigrant agency laws, but the constitutional source
of protection has not always been clearly identified. When Joseph v.
Randolpt 27 came before the supreme court of Alabama in 1882, counsel for
appellant described the law as "a vicious species of class legislation.' 28
"It is a naked attempt to tax a constitutional right out of existence." "Its
purpose is to make the laborer a mere thing-a fixture of the soil."' 2 9 Oppos-
ing counsel noted that the Eounties embraced in the act were mainly agricul-
tural and exposed to the depopulating effects of the "Kansas exodus" move-
nent and the recruiting activities of railroad contractors and other industries,
12 The right of egress under consideration in this paper has only the narrowest rela-
tion to Art. IV, § 2. The courts have inierpreted that section as intending to relieve
citizens "from the disabilities of alienage in other states," to give them "the right of
free ingress into other states, and egress from them," etc. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall 168,
180 (U. S. "1868). The emigrant agency laws, contrary to the expected situation, inhibit
mainly the egress of their own citizens. Presumably but a limited number of emigrants
under the laws could claim state citizenship in other states, and so invoke Art. IV, § 2.
The ambiguous wording of this section, of course, suggests the possibility that citizens
of a state, while in their own state, could demand for themselves the privileges and
immunities accorded citizens of all other states. See (1942) 40 MicH. L. REV. 711, 718,
n. 36.
'
24See dissenting opinion of Justice Stone in Colgate v. Harvey, and concurring opinion
of Justice Douglas in Edwards v. California, supra note 64.
125Cf. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 251, 49 Sup. Ct. 279, 280
(1929) ; Colgate v. Harvey, note 64 at 444, 56 Sup. Ct. at 265 (1935).
'
26Edwards v. California, supra note 64 at 177, 62 Sup. Ct. at 168 (1941). Similarly
Justice Jackson said (Id. at 182, 62 Sup. Ct. at 171) : "To hold that the measure of his
rights is the commerce clause is likely to result eventually either in distorting the
commercial law or in denaturing human rights."
'
27Supra note 7. ,
'
28The identical description was later applied by a district court to the law involved
iff the Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671, 689 (D. C. M. D. Ala. 1903).
129Counsel for appellant attacked the law on several constitutional grounds; apparently
he rested the right of egress on Art. IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution. (See
note 123 supra). The fourteenth amendment was invoked for equal protection of the
laws to the laborers affected by the state law.
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"thus endangering the farming interests. This is the reason of; and hence
arose the necessity for the statute." Defendant argued that the legislature
must be sole judge of the necessity for the law.
The court took the primary question to be the following:
"It is insisted, among other things, that the plain intent and natural
effect of this statute is to tax, by indirection, the constitutional right of
the citizen to have free egress, at all seasonable times, by emigration
from the State. If this view be correct, it is clear that the validity of the
act cannot be sustained."
The court recognized that free transit from or through the ferritory of any
state was an attribute of personal liberty, "guaranteed to all by the clearest
implications of the Federal as well as the State constitution." This right was
held referrable to many clauses in the federal Constitution.180 The court also
noted a provision in the Alabama constitution that "emigration shall not be
prohibited."' 3 1 Free ingress and egress being an undoubted constitutional
right, the state could qualify it only by legitimate exercise of the police or
taxing powers. In striking down the emigrant agency law as an unwarranted
exercise on either ground, the court said:
"A law, as we have seen, would certainly be void which exacted tribute
of a citizen as the price of crossing a State line. Does the license in
question operate manifestly as a tax, by indirection, upon the right of
the citizen to leave the State, or does it so burden this right as to effec-
tually impair it? No principle of construction is sounder than the common
sense and cardinal rule, that 'what cannot be done directly cannot be
'done indirectly'-Ex parte Hardy, 68 Ala. 303; Cimmmings v. Missouri,
4 Wall. 277. If the law should act upon any other theory, it would subject
itself to the! just challenge of catching at shadows and iwt substances.
Hence, a constitutional right, though subject to regulation, 'cannot be
impaired, or destroyed, under the device or guise of being regulated'.
South & North Ala. R.R. Co. v. Morris, 65 Ala. 193.
"It is easy to see the application of this principle in construing the
statute now under review. Every person, including every laborer, has
the right of egress from the State-the right to emigrate at his option,
and in the unobstructed exercise of his free will. He has, therefore, the
clear right to contract to exercise such right, because it may become a
necessary and only means of its 'successful exercise. If the right itself
exists and is lawful, it cannot become unlawful to agree to exercise it."
13OThe court referred to Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (U. S. 1870), as placing
it within the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states guaranteed by
Art. IV, § 2; to the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (U. S. 1849), as placing it within the
scope of the commerce clause; and to Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1867), as
recognizing it to have "an undoubted existence," despite the difference of opinion as to
its constitutional ground.1 31 ALA. CO NST. of 1875.
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The argument that no license was required of the laborer to contract was held
"patently fallacious." Every contract, said the court, required two parties;
a law against one affected the other, just as a law forbidding the purchase of
any article was in effect a law to prohibit the sale,132 or a tax upon a carriei
for each passenger was a tax upon the passenger.133
Considering this vigorous affirmation of the "laborer's right of free emi-
gration," it is difficult to see why the court judged that a tax upon the single
act of hiring for outside employment would "seriously clog and impair" the
right while a tax upon the business would make it but "remotely affected."
The obvious purpose and intent in both circumstances was the same; by
cloaking the law in a general tax act, as many states subsequently did, the
ban on free movement of laborers was invested with the dubious dignity
of. a profession. We noted elsewhere 134 that application of the law has tended
to wait, not upon the conduct of a business, but upon any instance in which
laborers were being hired for employment beyond the state. The distinction
made by the Alabama court was purely verbal from the standpoint of pre-
serving free ingress and egress, and it has afforded other courts the oppor-
tunity to differentiate their decisions. 35
The supreme court of North Carolina in 1893, we also noted, 3 6 struck
down the emigrant agency law of that state as an unwarranted application
of the police power to an occupation which gave effect to the undoubted right
of a laborer to offer his services in hire and pursue any lawful calling, whether
inside or beyond the state.
The Georgia law was squarely challenged before the supreme court of that
state in Williams v. Fears as an interference with the right of a citizen to
move from one state to another, abridging the "privileges and! immunities of
citizens of the United States" within the meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court held the contention without merit on the basis of its denial
that the law conflicted with the national commerce power.137 It will be
'
32Citing Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827) and Welton v. Missouri,
91 U. S. 275 (1875).
'
33 Citing Passenger Cases and Crandall v. Nevada, supra note 130.
'
3 4See the discussion in Part I (E), (1943)'28 CORNELL L. Q. 286, 304.
13 5Williams v. Fears (Ga.), supra note 4; Williams v. Fears (U. S.), supra note 5;
State v. Napier, supra note 30; In re Craig, supra note 7.
'
36State v. Moore, supra note 11.
137The court said in this connection: "But the law under consideration in the present
case neither regulates nor restricts the right of citizens of this state to leave its territory
at will, nor to hold free communication with the citizens of other states. The citizen
may leave when he pleases, but the person who makes it a business of inducing him
to go to perform labor elsewhere must pay an occupation tax. This is certainly no
infringement upon the right of the citizen." Williams v. Fears (Ga.), supra note 4, at
591, 35 S. E. at 701, 702 (1900).
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remembered that the court there considered the right of persons to enter and
leave the state freely as an incident of intercourse comprehended within the
term "commerce."' 38 In taking exception to Joseph v. Randolph, the court
assumed that the Alabama decision voided the law under review as contrary
to the commerce clause of the federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court of the United States, taking Williams v. Fears on
appeal, gave first consideration to the insistence of plaintiff that the law con-
flicted with the fourteenth amendment by impairing the right of free move-
ment. The language of the Court is often quoted in affirmation of this prin-
ciple,13 9 though the effect of the decision was to destroy' it. The Court said:
"Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one
place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty,
and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of
any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other
provisions of the Constitution."
The Court associated with the right of locomotion the attributes of personal
liberty which had been earlier set forth in Allgeyer v. Louiamza as protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 40 But, said the Court,
'
35 See supra p. 503.
139 For example, Justice Douglas concurring in Edwards v. California, note 64 at 179,
62 Sup. Ct. at 169 (1941).
'4OThe language in Williams v. Fears is as follows: "And so as to the right to con-
tract. The liberty, of which the deprivatioh without due process of law is forbidden,
'means not only the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties;
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that
purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned; . . . although it
may be conceded that this right to contract in relation to persons or property or to do
business within the jurisdiction of the state may be regulated and sometimes prohibited
when the contracts or business conflict with the policy of the state as contained in its
statutes'. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 591; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S.
366."
Warren comments that Chief Justice Fuller's "locomotion" adds nothing to the defini-
tion of "liberty" in the Allgeyer case, because it "may well be treated as part of freedom
of restraint of the person." Warren, The New Liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment,
(1926) 39 H~av. L. Rnv. 431, 450. The Chief Justice was merely expounding Black-
stone's definition of "personal liberty" which "consists in the power of locomotion, of
changing situation, of moving one's person to whatever place one's inclination may
direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law." 1 BL. Comm. 72
(Gavit ed. 1941). From its origin and context, the assertion as to right of movement in
Williams v. Fears appears to be based on the due process clause rather than on the
privileges and immunities clause. The Chief Justice did not specify the clause, but he
proceeded to hold against plaintiff's objections "in the particulars named," and one of
these was the contention that the right of movement was restricted in violation of the
privileges and immunities clause. Justice Douglas, concurring in Edwards v. California,
quotes from Williams v. Fears in support of his position that the right of movement is
protected by the privileges and immunities clause. Supra note 64 at 179, 62 Sul). Ct.
at 169 (1941). Justice Stone, dissenting in Colgate v. Harvey, assumes that Williams
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the law under review was a taxing act, levied on occupations, including that
of emigrant agent.
"If it can be said to affect the freedom of egress from the State, or
the freedom of contract, it ,is only incidentally and remotely. The indi-
vidual laborer is left free to come and to go at pleasure, and to make
such contracts as he chooses, while those whose business it is to induce
persons to enter into contracts and to change their location, though left
free to contract, are subjected to taxation in respect of their business
as other citizens are."
The Court.apparently took the cue from Joseph v. Randolph in judging that
the revenue label of the emigrant agency law transformed a primary right
into an incidental one. But the Court ignored the substantive opinion in the
Alabama case, which exposed the hollowness of the argument that the right
of the laborer himself was untouched by the law. To contract in exercise of
the right "may become a necessary and only means of its successful exer-
cise.' 1 4 1 Labor agents act as intermediaries in low-wage occupations 'and per-
form services for which no adequate substitute machinery has yet been de-
vised.14 Even the Employment' Service has been unable to dispense with
these agents.'
43
Aside from the effect on instruments which facilitate the movement of
laborers,, infringement of the constitutional right is established by the intent
of the law. The courts as well as administrative officers and employers in the
states affected have frequently declared that the purpose of their emigrant
agency laws was to prevent the removal of laborers considered necessary for
employing interests within these states. Almost as frequently they have
declared that the laws were directed toward the protection of these laborers.' 44
v. Fears c6nsidered egress in relation to the privileges and- immunities clause, but then
seems to draw an improper inference-that the emigrant agency decision rejected in
principle protection of interstate movement by the privileges and immunities clause.
Supra note 64 at 448, 449, 56 Sup. Ct. at 268 (1935).
' 141Joseph v. Randolph, supra note 7 at 506, 507 (1882). Counsel for appellant said
at 502: "Contracts to labor in another state are the ordinary and usual modes for a
laborer's obtaining means to move .... The tax is a prohibition. It prevents advances
to enable him to leave, on the faith of his promise to labor in his new home. Its pur-
pose is to make the laborer a mere thing-a fixture to the soil."
142See Hearings on H. R. 5510, pp. 177, 178; also Farm Labor Program, 1943, Hear-
ings before Sidbcommittee of Committee on Appropriations on H. J. Res. 96, U. S. Senate,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. pp. 107, 108.
143 See, for example, Tolan Committee Hearings, part 5, 1826; part 28, 10758; part 33,
12492.
'4 4A typical two-sided declaration is the following: "The occupation taxes in Texas,
as in other States, were intended to be a deterrent to the exploitation of migratory
laborers. They were established to discourage invasions from outside on the State's
labor market and mobile workers." Report of Texas State Employment Service, Tolan
Committee Hearings, part 5, 1810.
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It need not be denied that the legislature and law enforcement officials are
more familiar than resident workers with the possibilities of abuse and
exploitation in out-of-state employment. 145 But the logic of the emigrant
agency law, we have said, is anticipatory and prohibitive ;146 all outside em-
ployment a priori is made harmful, 1 47 and would-be jobholders are automati-
cally denied their fundamental rights under the guise of protecting their wel-
fare. Texas officials, for example, who fear that their workers may be "over-
influenced"'148 by unscrupulous emigrant agents, couple their concern with
14 5"We have many cases on record where employers in other states enticed laborers
from Texas and then refused to give them employment." Testimony of Texas Commis:
sioner of Labor Statistics, Hearings on H. R. 5510, 172.
146 Supra p. 485.
14 7When the state of Florida attempted by an emigrant agency law to restrict the
movement of laborers among counties within the state, the supreme court of Florida said
[Ex parte Messer, 87 Fla. 92, 101, 99 So. 330, 333 (1924) 1:
" . . . to the extent that opportunities and avenues of employment are, by the re-
straining influences of the statute, arbitrarily or unreasonably denied or closed to
persons who exchange th~eir services for money or other forms of property, which
includes a large proportion of the residents of the state, the statute is an unwarranted
interference with an essentially innocent exercise of liberty of contract. It in no
sense deals with hours 6f labor or payment of wages. It has no relation to con-
tracts of employment that may be immoral. It is not concerned with whether the
place of employment is safe or sanitary. No such basis can be found for it. It
attempts to deal with ordinary business relations of individuals which have here-
tofore been regarded as free from arbitrary governmental restriction because of
constitutional limitations. It is, we think, clearly within the inhibitions of the
constitutional guaranties of liberty of persons to contract, as construed by the cases
cited which are binding upon this court, and therefore transgresses legislative power."
148 This word occurs in the emergency clause appended to Senate Bill No. 127 which
was passed by the Texas 41st legislature, second called session. Texas Gen. and Spec.
Laws 1929, 2d and 3d called sessions, c. 96, p. 203. Section 11 of the bill reads:
"The fact that the State of Texas has come to be recognized as a fruitful field
for the activities of emigrant agents, and the further fact that a large percentage of
the individuals solicited by said agents are uneducated and not fully cognizant of
their rights and are susceptible of being overinfluenced, and the further fact that
there exists no law providing for a reasonable regulation of said business, creates
an emergency and an imperative public necessity that the constitutional rule requir-
ing bills to be read on three separate days be suspended, and the same, is hereby
suspended, and that this act become effective from and after its passage, and it is
so enacted."
According to the Texas Commissioner of Labor Statistics this clause "very clearly
expresses the legislative intent." Hearings on H. R. 5510, 172. A more explicit
expression of legislative intent is given in the emergency clause to House Bill No. 207
passed by the first called session of the same legislature (Texas Gen. and Spec. Laws
1929, 1st called session, c. 104, p. 253), which bill was soon after repealed when a federal
court enjoined its enforcement. Section 10 of this bill read:
"The fact that the State of Texas has come to be recognized as fruitful field
for the activities of emigrant agents who by their efforts cause seasonal depletion
of the essential labor supply of the State for the needs of the agricultural, ranch and
other industries of Texas, and the fact that the 'effect of the continuous operations
of such agents have become a source of periodical unrest among the laborers of
the State and that the number of such agents has increased to an extent affecting
the economical welfare of the State in its essential farm, ranch and industrial
development and the fact that the necessary supply of labor in Texas is by reason
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an admission that higher wages in the beet fields of the North offer an induce-
ment to annual worker migration from the state.149 The Texas employment
service since its inception has championed enforcemefit of the emigrant
agency law, and in accord with the spirit of the law has consistently refused
to refer workers to outside employment 50 despite a heavy surplus of labor
at the harvesting peak within the state.' 51 In commenting on the attitude of
Texas employment service officials, the counselor to the general consul of
Mexico located at San Antonio stated to a Congressional investigating com-
mittee in the fall of 1940 :152
"It is contended by some people that the cotton kings of Texas are
responsible for the legislation in Texas, the effect of which is to force
laborers to stay in Texas and pick cotton for 50 cents a hundred pounds
of natural conditions subject to fluctuations that periodically curtail adequate labor
supply, and the fact that the vocation of emigrant agent, by reason of the foregoing
facts, requires State regulation create an emergency and an imperative public
necessity that the Constitutional Rule requiring bills to be read on three several days
in each House be suspended, and said Rule is hereby, and this Act shall take effect
and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so enacted."
Incidentally the emergency clause appears to be something of a routine. We find it also
appended to an early Texas employment agency law passed before the first World War
(Tlxas Gen. Laws 1915, § 9, p. 165) and to any emigrant agency law enacted in 1917
(Texas Gen. Laws, 2d called session, 35th Leg., c. 36, § 9, p. 108).
14 9 Tolan Committee Hearings, part 5, 1845. The natural effect of this migration
opportunity is to make the laborers less contented with low wages in the home state.
The following claim is interesting in juxtaposition: "Incidentally this movement of
workers without regulation each season has a tendency to break down wage standards
in other states." Testimony of Texas Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Hearings on
H. R. 5510, 172.
3.5o"We are not going to recruit 500 or 100 or any Mexicans for Michigan if that
doesn't follow the law on our statute books. . . . " Testimony of Texas Farm Place-
ment Supervisor, Texas Employment Service, Tolan Committee Hearings; part 5, 1840.
See also Id. at part 33, pp. 12484, 12485; MENEFEE, MEXICAN MIGRATORY WORKERxS OF
SOUTH TExAs [Work Projects Administration, Division of Social Research (1942)]
pp. 30, 31.
15 1A memorandum to the Labor-Management Advisory Committee of the War Man-
power Commission submitted by the director of the U. S. Employment Service on August
20, 1942, estimated a surplus of 200,000 Texas agricultural workers above harvesting
requirements in September of 1942. At the same time growers in Texas and elsewhere
were, clamoring for the importation of Mexican workers. It is instructive to note this
observation in the summer of 1942 by the director of the legal department, National
Catholic Welfare Conference (Tolan Committee Hearings, part 33, 12419) :
"It seems to me after this recent visit to San Antonio, what we have is exploita-
tion, rather crude and sordid, of an oversupply of labor-labor that is worth so little
that very little effort is made to conserve it. So that you have a great residue of
labor that through 'malnutrition, unsanitary conditions, lack of education is being
reduced to uselessness. The residue of that labor, perhaps as many as 20,000 or30,000 people in San Antonio alone, are living in swamps in miserable huts; they
can't even rent a room in the buildings constructed by the Housing Administration.
I think that rather than bring new labor from Mexico the effort should be made by
the agricultural interests to conserve the labor that has been brought from Mexico
and I don't think anything at all worth while has been done along that line."
15 2Tolan Committee Hearings, part 5, 1863.
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instead of being permitted to leave the State freely at the request of
large concerns in other States of the Union where they might earn three
and four times more money."
Vigorous attempts of South Carolina and Georgia to enforce their emi-
grant agency laws'5 3 acquire added significance when it is considered that
these states have the lowest agricultural wage rates in the countFy.
1 5 4
The right to move freely in search of economic betterment is a mark of
national citizenship and fundamental in our system of constitutional guar-
antees. So say justices Douglas and Jackson in the Edwards case as they
raise anew the banner of the "almost forgotten privileges and immunities
clause."'u5 The restrictions imposed by the emigrant agency laws fall squarely
within the principle of the California penal statute which these concurring
opinions reject. In both laws the restrictions would act upon those instru-
mental in effecting the movement of citizens and not upon these citizens
directly. The original parties to the controversy in the Edwards case were
in complete accord'156 that the issue ultimately involved the constitutional rights
of the migrant Duncan and not those of Edwards himself. The attorney
general of California, appearing in behalf of the state at the request of the
Supreme Court, and entering the case in its later stage, insisted that the
statute making it a misdemeanor to bring, or assist in bringing, an indigent
person into the state did not affect the right of the indigent to, enter at his
own option.157 The Court did not deem the distinction worthy of consideration
in its opinion.15s And the following language0 0 of Justice Douglas, concurred
153See Part I, (1943) 28 CORNELL L. Q. 286, 293.
'5 4The U. S. Dep't. of Agriculture reported that daily farm wages without board in
South Carolina and Georgia were $1.40 and $1.55 respectively on April 1, 1943. Release
dated April 14, 1943. These farm wage rates were approximately, half the national
average and less than a quarter of those in the best-paying states. For a survey of legal
measures designed to tie workers to a low-wage agricultural economy, see Zeichner,
The Legal Status of the Agricultural Laborer in the South, (1940) 55 POL. Sci. Q. 412.
'
00 Phrase of Justice Stone in Colgate v. Harvey, mupra note 64 at 443, 56 Sup. Ct. at 265
(1935). The overruling of Colgate v. Harvey by Madden v.'Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 93,
60 Sup. Ct. 406, 411 (1940) does not, in our opinion, constitute a serious setback for
application of the privileges and immunities clause to issues such as those under review
in this paper. Even Justice Stone might have been willing to grant protection of the
fourteenth amendment to the right of egress.
'S6Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee and Respondent, both reprinted in
Tolan Committee Hearings, part 26, pp. 9998, 10004.
157Brief of the Attorney General of California on behalf of the Appellee, reprinted in
Tolan Committee Hearings, part 26, pp. 10012, 10020.
'155However, the fact that the majority opinion rested the case on the commerce clause
has evoked the judgment that the rights of the migrant Duncan were ignored. Silverman,
Hman. Cargo Still on thw Move, (1942) 10 GEO. WAsir. L. REV. 528, 538. This raises
the question whether the Court would have permitted Duncan to invoke protection of
the commerce clause in the event that the California law were aimed at barring him
directly. Such laws have been proposed in the California legislature. See Supplement
1943]
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in by Justices Black and Murphy, we hold to be conclusive of the question
whether the constitutional rights of citizens are infringed by the emigrant
agency laws:
"The conclusion that the right of free movement is a right of national
citizenship stands on firm historical ground. If a state tax on that move-
ment, as-in the Crandall case, is invalid, a fortiori a state statute which
obstructs or in substance prevents that movement must fall. That result
necessarily follows unless perchance a State can curtail the right of free
movement of those who are poor or destitute. But to allow such an
exception to be engrafted on the rights of national citizenship would be
to contravene every conception of national unity. 'It would also introduce
a caste.system utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system of gov-
ernment. It would permit those who were stigmatized by a State as
indigents, paupers, or vagabonds to be relegated to an inferior class of
citizenship. It would prevent a citizen because he was poor from seeking
new horizons in other States. It might thus withhold from large seg-
ments of our people that mobility which is basic to any guarantee of free-
dom of opportunity. The result would be a substantial dilution of the
rights of national citizenship, a serious impairment of the principles of
equality. Since the state statute here challenged involved such conse-
quences, it runs afoul of the privileges and immunities clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."
to Brief of John H. Tolan, amicus curiae, reprinted in Tolan Committee Hearings, part
26, pp. 10118,'10119. In the Chirillo case, 283 N. Y. 417, 435, 28 N. E. (2d) 895, 902
(1940), involving compulsory removal of an indigent, Judge Finch, who discussed the
substantive issues of the case in his ,dissent, suggested that the aggrieved had no cause
to raise the question of the commerce power.
With regard to the privileges and immunities clause, Justices Douglas and Jackson,
concurring in Edwards v. California, judged that the privileges or immunities of Duncan
were abridged by a law ostensibly pointed at Edwards. In a territorial emigrant agency
case (In re Craig, supra note 7), however, the supreme court of Hawaii refused to
consider the contention of an alleged emigrant agent that the law abridged the laborer's
right of free egress under the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment (aside from the court's unwillingness to decide whether that amendment applied
to the Territory). The adverse opinions take their lead from Hatch v. Reardon, 204
U. S. 152, .160, 27 Sup. Ct. 188, 190 (1907), where Justice Holmes said: " . . . unless
the party setting up the unconstitutionality of the state law belongs to the class for
whose sake the constitutional protecti6n is given, or the class primarily protected, this
court does not listen to his objections, and will not go into imaginary cases, notwith-
standing the seeming logic of the position that it must do so, because if for any reason,
or as against any class embraced, the law is unconstitutional, it is void as to all." See
also Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 20 Sup. Ct. 284 (1900) ; Cronin v. Adams, 192
U. S. 108, 24 Sup. Ct. 219 (1904). Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 38, 36 Sup. Ct. 7,
9 (1915), where the law made the master subject to prosecution, but the servant was
permitted to complain because the law in effect curtailed his own rights.
159Edwards v. California, supra note 64 at 181, 62 Sup. Ct. at 170 (1941).
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